The Divorce Process in Hong Kong: Steps and Typical Timeline

The question many people ask: how long does a Hong Kong divorce actually take?

A divorce in Hong Kong is not a document you sign. It is a timeline strung together by statutory thresholds — the court must have jurisdiction, the marriage must be old enough, it must be proved by facts the Ordinance itself lists that "the marriage has broken down irretrievably", and the decree comes in two stages: conditional first, final second. This article answers that line: who may file in Hong Kong, what has to be proved, and how long each step must take as a minimum.

The governing statute is the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap. 179). Its long title says so in terms:

The procedural detail sits in the Matrimonial Causes Rules (Cap. 179A). Maintenance, division of property and financial provision for children after the divorce belong to a different statute — the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap. 192). In one line: Cap. 179 is how you get divorced; Cap. 192 is how things are divided afterwards. This article covers the first only; for the second, see "Next Steps" at the end.

What this actually is

One ground, two ways of bringing it

*Hong Kong has exactly one ground for divorce: that the marriage has broken down irretrievably. Adultery, unreasonable behaviour, periods of separation — none of these is a "ground". They are the facts by which the single ground is proved.* Section 11 is headed "Ground for divorce, etc.":

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The Chinese text of the same section:

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So the Ordinance separates two routes at the outset: a petition (brought by one spouse) and an application (made by both together). The facts each route must prove are in sections 11A and 11B respectively, dealt with below. Sections 11B and 11C were added, and both section 11 and section 11A replaced, by Ordinance No. 29 of 1995 s.7, and the Ordinance's own editorial note records that amending Ordinance's commencement date as 24 June 1996. Section 11C(2) was later repealed by Ordinance No. 4 of 2008 s.15, which is why s.11C as quoted below has only a subsection (1) — which is to say the joint application route dates from the 1995 reform.

Where does the case go? Section 10A is headed "Commencement and transfer of proceedings", and s.10A(1) opens:

That is the Family Court, a division of the District Court. The proviso to the same subsection allows transfer to the High Court, and transfer or retransfer from the High Court back to the District Court.

The first gate: does the Hong Kong court have jurisdiction?

This is the one people get wrong most often: marrying in Hong Kong does not mean a Hong Kong court will hear your divorce. What the Ordinance looks at is not where you married but each party's connection with Hong Kong. Section 3, headed "Jurisdiction in divorce":

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The Chinese text of the same section:

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Three points to pull out:

• The three limbs are alternatives. Meeting any one of them is enough; you do not need all three.
• One party's connection is enough. The text says "either of the parties to the marriage" — it does not require both spouses to qualify.
• The two authentic texts use different words here. The English of s.3(c) is "substantial connexion"; the Chinese of the same paragraph is 「密切聯繫」. The Ordinance does not define the term.

There is a procedural consequence. Where jurisdiction is alleged under s.3(b) — the three years of habitual residence — rule 9(6) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules requires the petition or joint application to state each party's addresses, and the periods of residence at them, over that whole three-year period. The three years have to be accounted for address by address, not asserted in a sentence.

The second gate: the marriage must be a year old

As a rule, no divorce petition may be presented in the first year of a marriage. Section 12 is headed "Restriction on petitions within one year of marriage", and s.12(1) reads:

The exception, in s.12(2), sets a high bar:

Two common misconceptions are answered by the section itself:

• What is restricted is when you may file, not how far back you may reach. Section 12(3) provides that nothing in the section "shall be deemed to prohibit the presentation of a petition based upon matters which occurred before the expiration of the specified period". Things that happened inside the first year can still be relied on once the year is up.
• Getting leave is not the end of it. Section 15(3) provides that if it appears at the hearing that the leave "was obtained by the petitioner by any misrepresentation or concealment of the nature of the case", the court may dismiss the petition, or, if it grants a decree, "direct that no application to make the decree absolute shall be made during that period".

How the court actually decides

Single petition: the five facts (s.11A)

Saying the marriage is over is not enough. The petitioner must satisfy the court of at least one of the five facts in s.11A(2). Section 11A is headed "Proof of ground for petition". Section 11A(1): "A petition for divorce may be presented to the court by either party to a marriage." Section 11A(2):

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The Chinese text of the same subsection:

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Taken one at a time, in ordinary language:

• Adultery. The respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent. Note that the paragraph has two halves — the adultery, and the intolerability.
• Unreasonable behaviour. The respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent. The subsection itself sets no threshold of seriousness and says nothing about how many incidents are needed; that turns on the facts.
• Separation for 1 year with consent. The parties have lived apart for a continuous period of at least 1 year, and the respondent consents to a decree being granted.
• Separation for 2 years without consent. The parties have lived apart for a continuous period of at least 2 years. The respondent's consent is not required.
• Desertion for at least 1 year. The respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of at least 1 year.

Facts (a) and (b) each carry a six-month clock, set by section 15A ("Provisions to encourage reconciliation"):

• Adultery. Where the parties have lived with each other after the petitioner learned of the adultery, s.15A(3)(a) provides that if the period or periods together are "6 months or less", that living together "shall be disregarded" in deciding whether the petitioner finds it intolerable to live with the respondent — but s.15A(3)(b) provides that if it "exceeds 6 months", the petitioner "shall not be entitled to rely on that adultery" for the purposes of s.11A(2)(a).
• Behaviour. Section 15A(4) applies the same six-month disregard to living together after the last incident relied on.

In short: these two facts do not sit there indefinitely waiting to be used. On adultery, living together for more than six months after finding out takes the fact away.

Joint application: the two facts (s.11B)

A joint application blames nobody. It is a different set of facts, not a no-fault version of the petition. Section 11B is headed "Proof of ground for application, etc.". Section 11B(1): "An application for divorce shall be made to the court jointly by both parties to the marriage." Section 11B(2):

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The Chinese text of the same subsection:

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Section 11B(3)(a) describes the notice itself: "The parties to a marriage may at any time give to the court a written notice signed by each of them of their intention to apply to the court to dissolve their marriage." Rule 9(12) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules specifies the form: "For the purposes of a joint application, the notice referred to in section 11B(3) of the Ordinance shall be in Form 2E."

In one line: paragraph (a) requires that you have actually lived apart for a year; paragraph (b) does not — but it requires that you told the court, jointly, a year ago. The opening words are "either or both of the following facts", so one of them suffices.

A joint application blames neither party, and it has procedural rules of its own: rule 9(1)(b) provides that "A joint application shall be made by originating application" — a different starting document from a petition.

What "living apart" means in the Ordinance

The statutory definition is wider than most people assume: the test is not whether you share a flat, but whether you are living with each other in the same household. Section 11C is headed "Interpretation (Part III)", and s.11C(1) reads:

The Chinese text:

Note the drafting runs in the negative: living apart is the default, unless the parties are living with each other in the same household. "Household" is not "flat". Where, for housing reasons, the parties stay in the same unit but keep separate rooms, meals and finances, whether they are living apart is a question of fact on the circumstances of the case.

On whether a period is "continuous", s.15A(5):

That sentence contains two rules pulling in opposite directions: a reconciliation of up to six months in total does not reset the clock, but the time spent living together does not count towards the separation period either. The clock pauses; it does not restart — and the calendar time required stretches accordingly. The "Working the numbers" section below does that arithmetic.

Once the court is satisfied, must it grant a decree?

Section 15 is headed "Hearing of petition". Section 15(2):

Two points. First, the word is "shall" — once a fact is established, granting a decree nisi is a duty, not a discretion. Second, what is granted is a decree nisi, not the dissolution itself. Section 15(1) adds that "it shall be the duty of the court to inquire, in so far as it reasonably can, into any facts alleged by any party to the proceedings" — so even an unopposed case is not a rubber stamp.

From petition to decree absolute: three stages and the statutory periods

Whether the matter proceeds as a petition or as a joint application, a divorce moves through three principal stages.

Stage 1 — Filing and service

The petitioner (or both parties, in a joint application) prepares the papers and files them at the Family Court. Rule 9(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules opens with the words "Unless otherwise directed", and then requires a petition to contain the information in Form 2 and a joint application the information in Form 2C.

Families with children file one more document. The trigger in rule 9(3) is that the petition or joint application discloses a minor child of the family who is under 16, or who is over that age and is receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade or profession. In that case a separate written statement of the arrangements must accompany the papers — Form 2B for a petition, Form 2D for a joint application — with a copy of any medical report mentioned in it attached.

There are in fact three different tests here, each doing a different job: (1) the sixteen-or-in-education test in r.9(3) — when the statement above must be filed; (2) "any child of the family who is under the age of 18" in Cap. 192 s.19(1) — who the court may make custody and education orders about; and (3) the sixteen-or-in-education test in Cap. 192 s.18(5) — which children make the decree-absolute gate in Stage 3 below bite. Tests (1) and (3) are worded the same way but measured at different moments: r.9(3) looks at what the petition or joint application discloses; s.18(5)(a) looks at "the date of the order under subsection (1)". None of the three replaces another. For custody itself, see the guide listed under "Next Steps".

A single petition must be served on the respondent. The time to respond is in rule 15(2): the time limited for giving notice of intention to defend is "8 days after service of the document, inclusive of the day of service, or such other time as may be fixed". Rule 15(3) leaves a margin: "Notice of intention to defend a cause begun by petition may be given at any time before directions for trial are given, notwithstanding that the time limited for giving the notice has expired."

Stage 2 — Decree Nisi

Unless the court directs otherwise, an uncontested divorce travels the special procedure list; the decree is not granted by the court on the papers. Rule 33(2A) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules opens "Where a cause is an undefended cause begun by petition for divorce or judicial separation pending in the District Court, then, unless otherwise directed—", and it is subparagraph (ii) that then provides that "the registrar shall give directions for trial by entering the cause in a list to be known as the special procedure list" — so the special procedure list is the default route, not a fixture the court cannot alter; for a joint application, r.33(2B)(b) provides that "the registrar shall enter the cause in the special procedure list if he is satisfied" that the joint application is properly made with the information required by Form 2C and is accompanied by a separate written statement containing the information required by Form 2D.

Once the cause is entered, r.47A(1) requires that "the registrar shall consider the evidence filed by the petitioner" — the evidence is considered by the registrar, not a judge. If he is satisfied that the petitioner has sufficiently proved the contents of the petition, he makes and files a certificate to that effect; if he is not, "he may either give to the petitioner an opportunity of filing further evidence or remove the cause from the special procedure list whereupon rule 33(2A) shall cease to apply" (for a joint application, under r.47A(1A)(b), "he may either give to the joint applicants an opportunity of filing further evidence or reject the joint application"). On the filing of the certificate, r.47A(2) provides that "a day shall be fixed for the pronouncement of a decree by a judge in open court at a court of trial", and the registrar sends each party notice of the day and place together with a copy of the certificate, but "it shall not be necessary for any party to appear on that day". So the decree is pronounced by a judge in open court; it is only attendance that is dispensed with. Where the petition is contested, the matter is listed for hearing — the court hears evidence and argument on the disputed facts and legal issues before deciding whether to grant a Decree Nisi. A Decree Nisi does not actually end the marriage.

Cap. 179 fixes no period for this stage, but the Rules do. Rule 47(1) requires that "Not less than 10 days before the date fixed for the trial of a petition, the registrar shall give notice of the date, place and, as nearly as may be, the time of the trial to every party to the petition", and r.47(2) provides that "Except with the consent of the parties or by leave of a judge, no petition, whether defended or undefended, shall be tried until after the expiration of 10 days from the date on which directions for trial were given". Both are 10 days. Note the limit on their reach in r.47(3): "Nothing in this rule shall apply to a cause entered in the special procedure list" — so the undefended causes on the special procedure list (that is, the causes entered under r.33(2A)(ii) and r.33(2B)(b) above) are outside both 10-day periods. Beyond those, how long filing to decree nisi takes depends on service, whether the matter is defended, and listing — not on any figure in the statute.

Stage 3 — Decree Absolute

Between decree nisi and decree absolute, this is the one waiting period Cap. 179 writes down for that interval. (The same Ordinance writes down other periods: the 1 year in s.12(1) and the 6 months in s.15A(5) both bite before the decree nisi. The 3 months in s.17(2)(a) does fall after it — see route (5) below — but it governs when the other party may apply, not the interval itself. The rules fix periods of their own: the 10 days in Cap. 179A r.47(1) and (2) — see Stage 2 above.) Nor is this period absolute: s.17(1)(a) lets the court make the decree absolute "notwithstanding anything in section 15(5)" — see below. Section 15(5):

The Chinese text:

The 6 weeks commonly quoted for a divorce matter is not the figure in s.15(5): the Ordinance's figure is 3 months, followed by the closing words allowing a shorter period. The 6 weeks comes from the Judiciary's own divorce page, which states that six weeks after the court has granted a decree nisi you can apply for the decree to be made absolute, using Form 5 (for a petition) or Form 5A (for a joint application) — citing no provision, rule or general order. So there are three layers: the Ordinance says 3 months; the Ordinance allows the Chief Judge to fix a shorter period by general order; and the Judiciary publishes 6 weeks. (Cap. 179A r.55(4) does use 6 weeks, but as the deadline for issuing the notice on an application for a re-hearing, and it too can be displaced by a direction — the paragraph reads in full: "Unless otherwise directed, the notice must be issued within 6 weeks after the judgment and served on every other party to the cause not less than 14 days before the day fixed for the hearing of the application." Neither the 6 weeks nor the 14 days there has anything to do with the interval between decree nisi and decree absolute.) Every calculation in "Working the numbers" below uses the statutory 3 months only; where a shorter period has been fixed, what shortens is the s.15(5) leg of each calculation.

Who applies, and when?

• The spouse in whose favour the decree was pronounced: rule 65(1) — "Subject to paragraph (3), an application by a spouse to make absolute a decree nisi pronounced in his favour may be made by lodging with the registrar a notice in Form 5". The opening words "Subject to paragraph (3)" are not decoration: they are the doorway to the alternative route in r.65(3) (below).
• Joint applicants: rule 65A(1)(a) — "Subject to paragraph (3), an application to make absolute a decree nisi pronounced in favour of applicants in a joint application may be made by either of the joint applicants concerned by lodging with the registrar a notice in Form 5A", and the one who lodges it must notify the other in writing (r.65A(1)(b)). Again, "Subject to paragraph (3)".
• The party against whom the decree was granted: not immediately. Section 17, headed "Proceedings after decree nisi", s.17(2)(a):

> Where a decree nisi of divorce has been granted and no application for it to be made absolute is made, then, at any time after the expiration of 3 months from the earliest date on which such an application could have been made, an application for a decree absolute may be made by—

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> (i) in a case where the decree nisi was granted on a petition for divorce, the person against whom it was granted; or

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> (ii) in a case where such a decree was granted on an application for divorce, either of the parties by whom the application was made.

But those 3 months are not a fixed line in the calendar. Section 17(1) provides that where a decree nisi has been granted but not made absolute then, "without prejudice to section 16", "any person (excluding a party to the proceedings other than the Proctor)" may "show cause why the decree should not be made absolute by reason of material facts not having been brought before the court"; and the court may then (a) "make the decree absolute" "notwithstanding anything in section 15(5)", (b) rescind the decree nisi, (c) require further inquiry, or (d) otherwise deal with the case as it thinks fit. Section 17(2)(b) gives the court those same four powers on an application under s.17(2). The section that s.17(1) preserves is s.16, the Proctor's intervention. So the 3 months in s.15(5) is a period the court can override, not an immovable date.

And there is a third route: not through the registrar at all, but to a judge. That is what the opening words "Subject to paragraph (3)" in r.65(1) and r.65A(1)(a) point to. Rule 65(3): "Where there are circumstances which ought to be brought to the notice of the court before a decree nisi is made absolute, an application for the decree to be made absolute shall be made to a judge." It continues: "Unless otherwise directed, the summons by which the application is made" (or, where the cause is pending in the District Court, notice of the application) shall be served on every party to the cause other than the applicant and on any other person with whom adultery is alleged, "and the application shall be heard in open court". Rule 65A(3) states the same first sentence for joint applications, but without the service and open-court words. For the party against whom the decree was granted, r.65(4) adds: "An application by a spouse for a decree nisi pronounced against him to be made absolute may be made to a judge or the registrar", and the summons (or notice of application) must be "served on the other spouse not less than 4 clear days before the day on which the application is heard". Rule 65(5) then provides that an order granting an application under paragraph (3) or (4) does not take effect until the registrar has searched the court minutes and is satisfied as to the matters in paragraph (2). Joint applications have the parallel provision in r.65A(4): "An order granting an application under paragraph (3) shall not take effect until the registrar has searched the court minutes and is satisfied as regards the matters mentioned in paragraph (2)."

The children gate. Before a decree can be made absolute there are two further conditions, one of which is not in Cap. 179 — it is in Cap. 192. Section 18 of Cap. 192 is headed "Restrictions on decrees for dissolution, annulment or separation affecting children", and s.18(1) opens:

How that bites procedurally: rule 65(2)(e) requires the registrar to be satisfied "that the judge has made an order under section 18(1) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap. 192)" before making the decree absolute, and rule 65A(2)(a)(ii) says the same for joint applications. No s.18(1) order on the children's arrangements, no decree absolute. The same search carries a further condition: r.65(2)(d) requires the registrar to be satisfied "that no intervention under rule 61 or 62 is pending", and r.65A(2)(a)(i) says the same for joint applications.

Note, though, that s.18(1) offers more than one route. What is quoted above is only the opening words of the subsection; the grounds of satisfaction are (a), (b) and (c), and (b) itself has two limbs. Paragraph (a) is "that for the purposes of this section there are no children of the family to whom this section applies"; (b)(i) is arrangements that "have been made and are satisfactory or are the best that can be devised in the circumstances". The remaining two are s.18(1)(b)(ii), "it is impracticable for the party or parties appearing before the court to make any such arrangements", and s.18(1)(c), "that there are circumstances making it desirable that the decree should be made absolute or should be made, as the case may be, without delay notwithstanding that there are or may be children of the family to whom this section applies and that the court is unable to make a declaration in accordance with paragraph (b)". Limb (c) comes at a price: s.18(2) provides that the court "shall not make an order declaring that it is satisfied as mentioned in subsection (1)(c) unless it has obtained a satisfactory undertaking from either or both of the parties to bring the question of the arrangements for the children named in the order before the court within a specified time". So it is not accurate to say that an unresolved question about the children necessarily blocks the decree absolute — limb (c) with the s.18(2) undertaking exists for exactly that situation.

What happens if the gate is not observed is in s.18(3). "If the court makes absolute a decree nisi of divorce or of nullity of marriage, or makes a decree of judicial separation, without having made an order under subsection (1) the decree shall be void"; but the same subsection continues that "if such an order was made, no person shall be entitled to challenge the validity of the decree on the ground that the conditions prescribed by subsections (1) and (2) were not fulfilled". So this is not a formality — it is a condition of the decree's validity. Once the order has been made, however, the decree cannot be reopened on that ground. Section 18(4) adds: "If the court refuses to make an order under subsection (1) in any proceedings for divorce, nullity of marriage or judicial separation, it shall, on application by either party to the proceedings, make an order declaring that it is not satisfied as mentioned in that subsection" — where the court is not satisfied, either party is entitled to an order saying so.

Which children does the gate reach? Section 18(5) defines them: (a) "any minor child of the family who at the date of the order under subsection (1) is" (i) under the age of 16, or (ii) "receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not he is also in gainful employment"; and (b) "any other child of the family to whom the court by an order under that subsection directs that this section shall apply", where the court is of opinion that special circumstances make that desirable in the child's interests. This is the same sixteen-or-in-education test as rule 9(3) (see Stage 1 above), measured at a different moment: s.18(5)(a) looks at "the date of the order under subsection (1)".

The second condition is in Cap. 179: section 17A. It is headed "Financial protection for respondent in certain cases". Section 17A(1) requires two conditions together, not one. (a) The respondent to a petition in which the petitioner alleges a fact mentioned in s.11A(2)(c) or (d) "has applied to the court under this section for it to consider the financial position of the respondent after the divorce"; and (b) "a decree nisi of divorce has been granted on the petition and the court holds that the only fact on which the petitioner is entitled to rely in support of his petition is that mentioned in section 11A(2)(c) or (d)". The second limb matters: it is not enough that the petition relies on a separation fact — a decree nisi must already have been granted, and the court must hold that the separation fact is the only fact the petitioner is entitled to rely on. Section 17A(3):

It bites procedurally too: rule 65(2)(g) requires the registrar to be satisfied "that the provisions of section 17A of the Ordinance do not apply or have been complied with" — the paragraph immediately after the rule 65(2)(e) quoted above (the subrule runs (a) to (e) and then (g); there is no paragraph (f)). Section 17A(4) provides a way through: the court may proceed without regard to subsections (2) and (3) if it appears "that there are circumstances making it desirable that the decree should be made absolute without delay" and it has obtained a satisfactory undertaking from the petitioner to make such financial provision as the court may approve.

This site's reading: for a petitioner whom the court holds entitled to rely on s.11A(2)(c) or (d) as the only fact, s.17A is a statutory power in the respondent's hands to hold up the decree absolute; where other facts are also available to the petitioner, s.17A(1)(b) is not satisfied. Every timeline below assumes no s.17A(1) application has been made.

Leaving it too long calls for an explanation. The proviso to rule 65(2), in full: "if the notice is lodged more than 12 months after the decree nisi, the registrar may require the applicant to file an affidavit accounting for the delay and may make such order on the application as he thinks fit or refer the application to a judge" — the affidavit is not the end of it; the registrar may also make an order or hand the application to a judge. Joint applications have a parallel provision, r.65A(2)(b), where the 12 months runs from the date of the Cap. 192 s.18(1) order rather than from the decree nisi.

When is the marriage actually over? On the date the decree is made absolute. Remarriage is governed by section 18 ("Remarriage of divorced persons"): s.18(1) requires the decree to have been made absolute and one of "(a) there is no right of appeal against the decree absolute; or (b) the time for appealing against the decree absolute has expired without an appeal having been brought; or (c) an appeal against the decree absolute has been dismissed" — then "either party to the former marriage may marry again".

Note that financial arrangements — maintenance, division of property — and children's arrangements are usually dealt with in parallel with the divorce process, not necessarily before Decree Absolute. Some matters proceed to Decree Absolute while financial and children's issues are resolved in later hearings.

The question many people ask: counting from today, how soon can this be over?

The Ordinance can tell you the minimum. It cannot tell you the actual. The calculations below build a floor out of the statutory periods only; service, listing, hearings and any dispute add time that the statute does not write down and that is not counted here.

Working the numbers

Every period used comes from the text: the 1 year in s.12(1); the 1 year / 2 years in s.11A(2); the 1 year in s.11B(2); the 6 months in s.15A(5); the 3 months in s.15(5); the further 3 months in s.17(2)(a); and the 3 years in s.3(b). All expressed in months. (Cap. 179A adds two 10-day periods in r.47(1) and (2) and 4 clear days in r.65(4); those are notice and service periods inside the procedure and do not lengthen the floor from marriage to decree absolute, so they are not used below. Rule 47(3) also disapplies r.47 to a cause entered in the special procedure list.)

(0) Not relying on a separation fact at all: s.11A(2)(a), (b) and (e)

• Section 11A(2)(a) (adultery) and s.11A(2)(b) (behaviour) carry no accrual period whatever; s.11A(2)(e) (desertion) requires 1 year.
• None of the three requires a period of living apart to be accrued, and none requires the respondent's consent (desertion of course implies the parties are not living together). The only gates are s.12(1)'s 12 months since the marriage and s.15(5)'s 3 months.
• The adultery route carries a limit of its own, though: under s.15A(3)(b), where the parties live with each other after the petitioner learns of the adultery, "if the length of that period or of those periods together exceeds 6 months, the petitioner shall not be entitled to rely on that adultery for the purpose of section 11A(2)(a)". Continuing to live together for more than six months closes this fastest route outright.
• From the date of marriage to the earliest decree absolute: 12 + 3 = 15 months.
• So the 12-month gap between routes (1) and (2) below only arises where the petitioner is confined to a separation fact.

(1) The fastest route: separated from the day of the wedding, respondent consents

• Section 11A(2)(c) requires at least 1 continuous year of living apart = 12 months. Section 12(1) requires the marriage to be 1 year old = 12 months. Both gates open on the same day.
• Earliest presentation: month 12.
• Then s.15(5) requires 3 months.
• From the date of marriage to the earliest decree absolute: 12 + 3 = 15 months.

(2) The same route, but the respondent will not consent

• You fall back on s.11A(2)(d): at least 2 continuous years of living apart = 24 months. The 12 months in s.12(1) is already absorbed inside it.
• Earliest presentation: month 24. Plus the 3 months in s.15(5) = 27 months.
• Difference between the two routes: 24 − 12 = 12 months. That twelve months is what the respondent's consent is worth, in statutory terms.

(3) Not living apart: the joint-application notice route

• Section 11B(2)(b) only requires the notice to have been given not less than 1 year before the application. The paragraph requires no separation at all.
• This calculation assumes s.12(1) does not reach a joint application. Section 12(1) speaks of "no petition for divorce shall be presented", and s.11 lists "petition" and "application" as two distinct ways of instituting proceedings. If s.12(1) does reach joint applications, and the notice is given at once on marriage, the floor is the same 15 months, because both gates open on the same day.
• Application 12 months after the notice, plus the 3 months in s.15(5) = 15 months.
• The same 15 months as route (1), but counted from a different event: route (1) runs from the day the parties separated; route (3) runs from the day they both signed Form 2E.

(4) What a reconciliation does to the clock

• Section 15A(5): resumed cohabitation totalling not more than 6 months does not break continuity, but does not count towards the separation period either.
• So a 1-year fact can take up to 12 + 6 = 18 months to accrue, and a 2-year fact up to 24 + 6 = 30 months.
• A 2-year fact with a full 6 months of reconciliation, plus s.15(5): 24 + 6 + 3 = 33 months.
• Put another way, six months of trying again pushes route (2) from 27 months to 33.
• Note the ceiling on that, though: s.15A(5) disregards resumed cohabitation only while it totals 6 months or less. This site's reading: once the total passes 6 months the subsection no longer applies, so the period of living apart no longer satisfies the requirement of continuity and the count restarts — the cost is not "up to 6 months". To be clear, s.15A(5) states no consequence for exceeding 6 months (unlike s.15A(3)(b), which does); that consequence is this site's reading of the words, not the subsection's own.

(5) After the decree nisi, when can the other side apply?

• Section 15(5): the decree "shall not be made absolute" before this period expires. (This is not a deadline for lodging Form 5: rule 65(1), under which Form 5 is lodged, states no timing restriction of its own; it is simply that the registrar cannot make the decree absolute before the 3 months run.)
• Section 17(2)(a): if no application is made, a further "3 months from the earliest date on which such an application could have been made" must pass. This site's reading: the statute does not itself define that "earliest date"; this site reads it as the earliest date on which s.15(5) would permit the decree to be made absolute (i.e., 3 months after decree nisi), rather than the earliest date Form 5 could merely be lodged (which r.65(1) does not fix). That is an interpretive choice, not something the bare text settles.
• 3 + 3 = 6 months after the decree nisi before the party against whom it was granted may apply for the decree absolute themselves. Joint applicants are not subject to that 6 months: r.65A(1)(a) provides that an application to make absolute a decree nisi pronounced on a joint application "may be made by either of the joint applicants concerned by lodging with the registrar a notice in Form 5A", available as soon as the 3 months in s.15(5) have run.

(6) The jurisdiction gate can be the longest of all

• If neither spouse is domiciled in Hong Kong and neither can show a substantial connexion, the route left is the 3 years of habitual residence in s.3(b) = 36 months.
• Against route (2)'s 24 months: 36 − 24 = 12 months — the jurisdiction clock runs a full year longer than the two-year separation fact.
• Against route (1)'s 12 months: 36 − 12 = 24 months.

In one line: measured from the date of the marriage, and where the petitioner is confined to a separation fact (s.11A(2)(c) or (d)), the statute's own floor runs from 15 months (respondent consenting) to 27 months (respondent refusing); where s.11A(2)(a), (b) or (e) is available the floor is 15 months either way, and the respondent's consent makes no difference to it; a reconciliation stretches that to at most 33; and where jurisdiction itself has to be built from three years of habitual residence, that 36-month gate runs to presentation rather than to decree absolute, so the comparable floor there is 36 + 3 = 39 months, which governs everything above.

(These are floors derived from the statutory periods; they are not an assessment of any reader's case. Note that these figures are facts about the structure of the statute rather than about the calendar: s.15(5) itself permits the Chief Judge by general order, or the court in a particular case, to fix a shorter period, and where one has been fixed it is the s.15(5) leg of each calculation that shortens. Route (5) has to be read separately — the 3 months in s.17(2)(a) runs from "the earliest date on which such an application could have been made", so shortening s.15(5) moves that leg forward rather than shrinking it. Beyond that, s.17(1)(a) allows the court, where cause is shown, to make the decree absolute "notwithstanding anything in section 15(5)", so the 3 months can be bypassed altogether.)

Factors Affecting Overall Timing

The total time taken for a divorce varies widely, and depends principally on:

• Whether the matter is contested. Uncontested joint applications and uncontested single petitions move faster. Petitions raising allegations of unreasonable behaviour or adultery typically take longer because evidence must be considered.
• Children's arrangements. Disputes over custody, access, or removal from Hong Kong can materially extend the process.
• Division of property. Matters involving multiple properties, cross-border assets, business interests, or family trusts take longer.
• Social welfare reports. Where children's issues are complex, the court may direct the Social Welfare Department to prepare a social investigation report on the children's welfare. Awaiting that report adds time.
• Court listing. The Family Court's hearing diary governs the actual pace of any contested matter.

Beyond the individual statutory periods set out under "Working the numbers" above, Cap. 179 and Cap. 179A fix no period for the matter as a whole. Realistic timing estimates for any particular matter should be obtained from the solicitor handling the case.

Costs

There is a filing fee at the Family Court. Where a solicitor is engaged, there are legal fees. Parties of limited means may apply for legal aid through the Legal Aid Department. The tests are in the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91): s.9(a) lets the Director "make such inquiries as he thinks fit as to the means of the applicant and as to the merits of the case". Section 10(1) opens "Subject to subsections (2) and (3)", and the condition in s.10(1)(b) is "in the case of legal aid to which section 5 applies, subject to section 5AA, the financial resources of that person do not exceed the amount specified in that section in respect of financial resources" (s.10(1)(c) says the same for s.5A legal aid); s.10(3) provides that "A person shall not be granted a legal aid certificate in connection with any proceedings unless he shows that he has reasonable grounds for taking, defending, opposing or continuing such proceedings or being a party thereto"; the same subsection continues that the Director may also refuse legal aid where it appears that (a) only a trivial advantage would be gained; (b) the proceedings are simple enough that a solicitor would not ordinarily be employed; (c) it is unreasonable to grant legal aid in the circumstances; (d) the applicant has been outside Hong Kong for a continuous 6 months since applying; (e) the applicant has not complied with a requirement under s.9(b) or (c); (f) the applicant has let an offer of legal aid lapse or indicated a wish to withdraw; or (g) others share the applicant's interest in a substantially similar outcome (unless the applicant would be prejudiced by not being able to proceed alone or jointly). Note s.10(2) as well: "The Director may refuse to grant a legal aid certificate, although satisfied of the matters specified in subsection (1) if, in his opinion, the applicant has disposed of any capital or income for the purpose of satisfying the conditions specified in those paragraphs or has failed to maximise his earning potential so as to expend or reduce his financial resources for that purpose." — so even where everything in s.10(1) is satisfied, the Director may still refuse on the disposal-of-resources or earning-potential ground that subsection sets out. The current financial limits are published by the Legal Aid Department. The Duty Lawyer Service provides free legal help for certain eligible applicants.

Related guides: see also dividing matrimonial property , child custody and access , and making a will , or browse our Hong Kong family law overview .

On a petition using the "unreasonable behaviour" fact, the question the statute asks is the one in s.11A(2)(b): that "the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent" — what has to be shown is the relationship between the behaviour and living together, not a label. Procedurally, an undefended petition proceeds on the special procedure list under r.33(2A)(ii) of Cap. 179A unless otherwise directed, and a joint application is entered under r.33(2B)(b) — see Stage 2 above; for the statutory time limits see the official waiting times page — it does not state actual listing figures, and explains where to find them.