Child Maintenance in Hong Kong: How Courts Assessed, Varied and Enforced It

About these case summaries: the summaries below were prepared by this site based on our own reading and understanding of the judgments. They are not legal advice, have no legal effect, and must not be cited as authority. Family judgments are already anonymised by the courts to initials; this article goes further and uses neutral citations only. The amount in every case turned on that family's specific needs and means, and does not indicate the outcome of any other case. Our research method is set out in our methodology .

The question many people ask

Many mothers have been here: separated from the child's father — perhaps through divorce, perhaps they never married at all. The three most practical questions: how is the maintenance figure actually worked out? If circumstances change later, can the figure be changed? And — if he simply doesn't pay, is the court order just paper? Six real judgments, from the Family Court up to the Court of Final Appeal, show how the decided cases answered each question.

Behind those three sits an earlier one: where do you go, and under which Ordinance do you apply? Get that wrong and the rest never arises. So this article starts there.

What this actually is: the orders the court can make, and who makes them

Child maintenance is not something parents settle privately between themselves. It is a court exercising a set of statutory powers — to order periodical payments, to order those payments secured, to order a lump sum, even to order property transferred. Which route you are on turns mainly on your marital status and where you are in any matrimonial proceedings — but it is not simply "married or not": as the table below shows, the Cap. 13 route itself is open, regardless of marital status, to whoever holds custody of the child at law. It is not a matter of preference.

Hong Kong has three statutory routes. The middle column reproduces each provision's own heading:

The names of the three Ordinances are taken from their own long titles: Cap. 13, "To consolidate and amend the law relating to the guardianship of minors"; Cap. 16, "To make better provision in Hong Kong for the granting by the District Court of separation and maintenance orders"; Cap. 192, "To consolidate and amend the law relating to ancillary and other relief in matrimonial causes and other matrimonial proceedings…".

Which route are you on? (check it against yourself)

• You are married and have started divorce proceedings (or nullity, or judicial separation) → Cap. 192, s.5.

- That route is not only about getting money. Section 18 of Cap. 192 carries the heading "Restrictions on decrees for dissolution, annulment or separation affecting children", and s.18(1) opens: "The court shall not make absolute a decree of divorce or of nullity of marriage, or make a decree of judicial separation, unless the court, by order, has declared that it is satisfied—"; the limb that usually matters, s.18(1)(b)(i), is that "arrangements for the welfare of every child so named have been made and are satisfactory or are the best that can be devised in the circumstances". And "welfare" is defined in the same section, at s.18(6): in that section the word, in relation to a child, "includes the custody and education of the child and financial provision for him". In other words, without an order under s.18(1) on the children's arrangements, the decree cannot be made absolute — but only where there is a child of the family within s.18's own defined class. Section 18 does not apply to every child of the family: s.18(5) confines it to a minor child who, at the date of the order, is under the age of 16 or is receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, plus any other child the court specially directs the section to apply to. Where there are no children of the family within that class, s.18(1)(a) itself supplies the answer — "that for the purposes of this section there are no children of the family to whom this section applies" — and no s.18(1) order is needed at all before the decree can be made absolute. Do not read the general rule as "no agreement on the money, no divorce", though: for children within the class, s.18(1) offers more than one route. Besides (b)(i) above there is (b)(ii), "it is impracticable for the party or parties appearing before the court to make any such arrangements", and (c), "that there are circumstances making it desirable that the decree should be made absolute … without delay notwithstanding … that the court is unable to make a declaration in accordance with paragraph (b)" — limb (c) being available only on the s.18(2) undertaking to bring the arrangements back before the court within a specified time.

• You are married but are not divorcing (or not yet) → Cap. 16. Note that this route is not open on demand: s.3 sets out the grounds on which an application may be made, one of which, s.3(1)(e), is that the other spouse "has failed to provide reasonable maintenance for the other party to the marriage or reasonable maintenance and education for that party's children whom the married person is legally liable to maintain". And s.3 is not the only gate. Section 6 is headed "Limitation of powers of District Court" and adds two more. Section 6(1): "No order shall be made under this Ordinance if it is proved that the applicant has committed an act of adultery", subject to a proviso that the applicant's spouse "has not condoned, or connived at, or by his or her wilful neglect or misconduct conduced to such act of adultery". Section 6(2): no order "shall be enforceable and no liability shall accrue under any such order whilst the married woman, and her husband, with respect to whom the order was made, reside together", and the order "shall cease to have effect if for a period of 3 months after it is made the married woman and her husband continue to reside together".
• You and the other parent never married → Cap. 13, s.10.

- Section 10(1), on custody and access, is on the application of "either of the parents of a minor (who may apply without next friend) or the Director of Social Welfare".

- But the money orders in s.10(2) describe the applicant differently: "a person with whom, whether by virtue of an order under subsection (1) or otherwise, custody of the minor lies at law". The order is made against "the parent or either of the parents of the minor".

- The starting point for a child born outside marriage is in s.3(1)(c): the mother "shall have the same rights and authority as she would have by virtue of paragraph (b) if the minor were legitimate"; the father "shall only have such rights and authority, if any, as may have been ordered by a court on an application brought by the father under paragraph (d)".

Who decides

• Cap. 192, s.2(1): "court" means "the High Court or the District Court".
• Cap. 13, s.2: "court" means "the Court of First Instance or the District Court".
• Cap. 16, s.3(1) closes by providing that the other party "may apply to the District Court for an order under this Ordinance".

One principle runs through all three routes: the best interests of the minor

Whichever route you are on, the statute writes down a first consideration for questions of a minor's custody and upbringing. Section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13) carries the heading "General principles". Section 3(1):

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In plain terms: the minor's best interests come first. Under that heading the section names two things the court must give due consideration to — what the child themselves wants (where age and understanding make that practicable), and whatever material information is in front of the court (the section names the Director of Social Welfare's report specifically). Section 3(1)(a)(ii) then adds a direction that matters just as much: on those same questions of custody, upbringing, administration or application, the court shall not consider, from any other point of view, whether one parent's claim is superior to the other's. For a reader on the Cap. 13 unmarried route that is the practical point — as between mother and father, the section itself sets no priority.

The two authentic texts differ in their wording at this point, and both are authentic: the English reads "the first and paramount consideration"; the Chinese reads 「首要考慮事項」.

Cap. 16 carries a matching sentence of its own, at s.5(3): "In making an order under subsection (1), the court shall have regard primarily to the best interests of the children."

How the court actually decides the figure: the statute lists factors, and lists no formula

No Ordinance sets out a "percentage of salary" calculation. What the statute sets out is a list of matters the court is under a duty to have regard to, and the words "as the court thinks reasonable". Those two things together are why the figure differs in every case.

The divorce route: the child's checklist in Cap. 192, s.7(2)

Section 7's heading is "Matters to which court is to have regard in deciding what orders to make under sections 4, 5 and 6". Section 7(2):

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The same subsection continues past paragraph (e) with a closing direction, which runs on in the text: "and so to exercise those powers as to place the child, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), just to do so, in the financial position in which the child would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of those parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards him."

So the statutory target is not "enough to get by". It is to place the child, so far as practicable and just, in the financial position they would have been in had the marriage not broken down and had both parents properly discharged their obligations. And the cross-reference to "paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1)" — s.7(1)(a), "the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future", and s.7(1)(b), "the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future" — is what this article is summarising when it uses the word "means". To be clear about the label: "means" is not a word Cap. 192 s.7 uses at all; it is Cap. 13 s.10(2)'s word ("having regard to the means of that parent"), used here as shorthand for the Cap. 192 factors just quoted.

Section 7(3) adds a separate set of factors for a child of the family who is not that party's own child (a stepchild, for instance): whether that party "had assumed any responsibility for the child's maintenance and, if so, to the extent to which, and the basis upon which, that party assumed such responsibility and to the length of time for which that party discharged such responsibility"; "whether in assuming and discharging such responsibility that party did so knowing that the child was not his or her own"; and "the liability of any other person to maintain the child".

The unmarried route: "as the court thinks reasonable" in Cap. 13, s.10(2)

Cap. 13 has no list resembling s.7(2). It does the work a different way — every order in the subsection ends with the same formula. Section 10(2), paragraphs (a) and (b):

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Two things follow. First, paragraph (a) reaches both the minor's "immediate and non-recurring needs" and liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred in maintaining the minor before the order was made — so recovering past spending is one of the order types the statute expressly contemplates (whether a court grants it is a separate question; see the decided case under "When circumstances changed" below). Second, every one of s.10(2)(a) to (e) closes with "as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent" — means is the yardstick the section itself repeats. (One thing to add: recovering pre-application spending is not peculiar to the unmarried route. Cap. 192 s.5(3) says the same on the divorce side: "Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2)(c), an order under this section for the payment of a lump sum to any person for the benefit of a child of the family, or to such a child, may be made for the purpose of enabling any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred by or for the benefit of that child before the making of an application for an order under this section to be met." Both routes expressly contemplate a lump sum meeting liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred before the application.)

What is statute and what is not

• Statute: the five matters in s.7(2)(a)–(e); the closing words of s.7(2) ("in the financial position in which the child would have been…"); the three matters in s.7(3); Cap. 192 s.5(3), allowing a lump sum to meet liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred before the application; "as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent" in Cap. 13, s.10(2), and the pre-order liabilities limb of s.10(2)(a); the best-interests provision in Cap. 13, s.3(1)(a)(i) and the no-priority-between-parents direction in s.3(1)(a)(ii); the best-interests provision in Cap. 16, s.5(3). All of these are words you can read in the enacted text.
• Not statute: any percentage. Section 7(2) contains no proportion from beginning to end — it does not say how a child's needs should be split between parents by reference to their incomes, and it sets no starting point. The 80/20, 50/50 and two-thirds figures in the decided cases below are the outcome of a court applying those factors on that case's evidence, not a rule laid down by the Ordinance.
• Also not here: on the asset-division side of a divorce, the "five-step framework" and the "yardstick of equal division" are judge-made, not found in Cap. 192 — and in any event they govern how assets are divided between the spouses, not how child maintenance is calculated. See the matrimonial-finance case article .

This site's reading (s.7(2) read with Cap. 13, s.10(2)): the two routes use different words but point at largely the same facts — "the financial needs of the child" plus each parent's "income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources" on one side; "the maintenance of the minor" plus "the means of that parent" on the other. Whichever route you are on, the paperwork to assemble is the same: the child's actual expense receipts, school fees, housing, and proof of both parents' income and assets.

1. How courts assessed it: the child's needs × the parents' means

There is no fixed tariff for child maintenance in Hong Kong. When married parents divorce, the court may order periodical payments, secured periodical payments or a lump sum for a child of the family under section 5 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap. 192); unmarried parents apply under section 10 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap. 13). The core of both routes is the same: assess the child's actual needs first, then share them according to each parent's means. The legislation provides that orders in principle run to age 18, extendable while the child remains in education or vocational training.

How this worked in the decided cases:

• In [2025] HKFC 27 (Family Court, 2025) — an application by an unmarried parent under Cap. 13. Going through the expenses item by item, the court assessed the child's monthly needs at trial at HK$16,000; as the mother then had no income, the father bore that stage in full, plus a HK$10,000 monthly carer's allowance. Looking ahead to the mother returning to work after hiring a domestic helper, the court assessed the child's monthly needs at HK$27,000 and, given the parents' huge disparity in earning capacity, held the father responsible for 80% (HK$21,600), plus HK$3,000 carer's allowance — HK$24,600 a month in total. The father claimed a gross monthly income of only HK$49,500 and an inability to pay; the court found he had failed to give full and frank financial disclosure and drew an adverse inference. Maintenance was backdated to the month after the application (November 2020), and the court ordered the father to pay a lump sum of HK$839,200 within 21 days.
• In [2025] HKFC 46 (Family Court, 2025) — a divorce ancillary-relief case. The court ordered the father to pay HK$15,000 a month per child in periodical maintenance until the children finish full-time education (first degree) or professional or vocational training, with education and medical expenses shared as to two-thirds by the father, by payment or reimbursement. The court also granted the section 18 declaration under Cap. 192 concerning the arrangements for the children.
• In [2024] HKCA 335 (Court of Appeal, 2024) — a big-money divorce with an asset pool of about HK$193.8M, child maintenance was set at HK$52,500 a month, with a further sum going into a child's education fund. We unpack this case in our matrimonial-finance case article .

From HK$15,000 to HK$52,500 a month across three cases — which is exactly the point: there is no "standard price". Every figure was built item by item from that family's actual expense receipts, school fees, housing and each parent's income.

The provisions in the previous section map straight onto that. Going through the expenses item by item is s.7(2)(a), "the financial needs of the child". A disparity in what each parent can earn is "earning capacity" in s.7(1)(a), pulled in by the closing words of s.7(2). Education expenses and an education fund are s.7(2)(e), "the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated". And on the Cap. 13 route, all of it collapses into a single phrase: "as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the means of that parent".

(Who the child lives with and how access works are a separate set of legal questions — see Child Custody and Access in Hong Kong .)

2. Until when is it payable? Age 18, and the conditions for running past it

The statutory default is 18 — and the same sections say how an order runs beyond it.

On the divorce route, Cap. 192, s.10 (heading: "Provisions as to powers of court to make orders in favour of children and duration of such orders") provides at s.10(1)(b) that the term for which payments are to be made or secured under a s.5 or s.8 order "may begin with the date of the making of an application for the order in question or any later date but shall not extend beyond the date when the child will attain the age of 18".

The same subsection carries an earlier gate that is easy to miss. Section 10(1)(a) provides that, "Subject to subsection (3)", "no order under section 5, 6(1)(a) or 8 shall be made in favour of a child who has attained the age of 18". So where the child is already 18 it is not only the term of payment that cannot run on — the order cannot be made at all except through the s.10(3) door described next.

The extension is in s.10(3), where it appears to the court that—

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The extension condition on the unmarried route is drafted almost identically. Cap. 13, s.12A (heading: "Provisions as to powers of court to make orders in favour of children and duration of such orders") provides at s.12A(1) that the term "shall not extend beyond the date when the child will attain the age of 18", and at s.12A(3)(a) that it may be extended where the child "is, or will be, or if such an order or provision were made would be, receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, whether or not that child is also, or will also be, in gainful employment".

But the two routes are not the same section in different words, and two differences matter:

• Cap. 13 has no equivalent of Cap. 192 s.10(1)(a). Section 12A governs only the term of an order; nothing in it forbids the court to make an order in favour of a child who has already turned 18.
• The age-18 limit in s.12A(1) does not reach all five orders in s.10(2). Section 12A(2) confines it to two classes: an order "for payment of a lump sum by instalments" under s.10(2)(a) and the related provisions, and an order "for periodical payments or secured periodical payments" under s.10(2)(b) or (c) and the related provisions. A lump sum ordered outright rather than by instalments, and the transfer-of-property and settlement-of-property orders in s.10(2)(d) and (e), are outside the s.12A(1) age-18 line.

There is a second kind of end date: the order stops — but read carefully which kind of order stops. Cap. 192, s.10(4) reaches only an order made "by virtue of section 5(2)(a) or section 8(6)(d)", that is unsecured periodical payments; Cap. 13, s.12A(4) likewise reaches only an order made "by virtue of section 10(2)(b), 11(1)(b)(ii), 12(b)(ii) or 13(2)(b)". Those orders "cease to have effect on the death of the person liable to make payments under the order, except in relation to any arrears due under the order on the date of such death".

The secured periodical payments order in the table at the top of this article is not within either provision. Cap. 192 s.10(4) does not name s.5(2)(b), and Cap. 13 s.12A(4) does not name s.10(2)(c) — so a secured periodical payments order does not simply die with the payer. Cap. 192 s.11(6) assumes the opposite: where the person liable under a secured periodical payments order made by virtue of s.5(2)(b) (among others) "has died", an application under s.11 relating to that order "may be made by the person entitled to payments under the periodical payments order or by the personal representatives of the deceased person, but no such application shall, except with the permission of the court, be made after the end of the period of 6 months from the date on which representation in regard to the estate of that person is first taken out". That is one of the practical differences between a secured and an unsecured order.

Those provisions are where the arrangements described below land in the statute: the order in [2025] HKFC 46 running until the children finish full-time education (first degree) or professional or vocational training, and the order in [2023] HKFC 231 running until the child reaches 18 or commences full-time tertiary education, whichever is the later.

3. Interim vs final orders

Family litigation can run for years; children cannot wait. The decided cases show the court making interim orders while proceedings run, with the final figure set at trial: in [2025] HKFC 27, the court ordered interim maintenance of HK$5,000 a month in 2021, increased it to HK$10,000 in 2022, and only set the final arrangement at trial in 2025; in [2025] HKFC 46, the 2023 interim order ceased when the final periodical-payments order took effect. The same first case also shows how far apart interim and final figures can be: HK$10,000 → HK$26,000, which is that case's first-stage arrangement — the child's monthly needs of HK$16,000 borne by the father in full, plus a HK$10,000 carer's allowance (16,000 + 10,000 = 26,000). Once the mother returns to work, the figure in the same case becomes HK$24,600 a month (above).

The statute makes room for this, but the two routes are not parallel. Cap. 192 s.3 is not the children's provision. Its heading is "Maintenance pending suit in case of divorce, etc.", but what it empowers is an order that "either party to the marriage … make to the other such periodical payments for his or her maintenance" — spouse to spouse, with no power over children. Interim provision for a child on the divorce route comes from s.5(1)(a), under which the court may make the orders listed in s.5(2) — which include periodical payments to or for the benefit of a child of the family — "before or on granting the decree of divorce, of nullity of marriage or of judicial separation, as the case may be, or at any time thereafter". Cap. 16 s.9 does cover children; it is headed "Power to order interim payments where application for maintenance is adjourned". But the power only arises once a threshold in s.9(1) is crossed: it is available "where … the application is adjourned for a period exceeding 1 week". Read on to s.9(2), though: "An order under this section shall operate for not more than 3 months from the date on which it is made." An interim order under that section is capped by the section itself at three months from the date it is made. The next subsection gives it its weight: s.9(3), "An order under this section shall be enforceable in like manner as if it were a final order of the District Court." Three months it may be, but for enforcement purposes it stands like a final order.

4. When circumstances changed, the figure changed

A maintenance order is not carved in stone — either the paying or the receiving party may later apply to the court to vary it.

The statute says so directly. Cap. 192, s.11 (heading: "Variation, discharge, etc. of orders for financial provision") provides at s.11(1): "Where the court has made an order to which this section applies, then, subject to the provisions of this section, the court shall have power to vary or discharge the order or to suspend any provision thereof temporarily and to revive the operation of any provision so suspended." (Those opening words "subject to the provisions of this section" are doing work — they are what carries the rest of s.11, including s.11(7) below, into the power.) Section 11(2)(c) applies the section to "any order made by virtue of section 5(2)(a) or (b) or 5(4)" — that is, the child's periodical payments, secured periodical payments, and the instalment terms of a lump sum (s.5(4) is the provision under which a lump sum order "may provide for the payment of that sum by instalments of such amount as may be specified in the order and may require the payment of the instalments to be secured to the satisfaction of the court"). The equivalent on the unmarried route is Cap. 13, s.10(4), under which an order may likewise be "varied, discharged, suspended or revived after being so suspended" — but s.10(4) carries its own carve-out, excluding "an order for a lump sum payment in one amount, for a lump sum to be paid in instalments where all such instalments have been paid or for the transfer of property".

But whether you may apply and what the court must be shown are different questions, and the second is the one to prepare for. Section 11(7) is the test that governs how the power is exercised: "In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates and, where the party against whom that order was made has died, the changed circumstances resulting from his or her death."

In one line: the court has regard to all the circumstances of the case, and the statute expressly names one thing that must be included in that — whether one or more of the matters the court was required to have regard to when it made the order (the s.7(2) factors, and the s.7(1)(a) and (b) matters they pull in) has changed, and how. Income, earning capacity, the child's financial needs, the manner of education: each read back against the order as it was made is the main thing to prepare. But "all the circumstances" is not limited to that: change is simply the one factor the subsection singles out by name, and it does not follow that a matter which has not changed is shut out from consideration. The subsection also brings in the changed circumstances resulting from the death of the party against whom the order was made, which is where the 6-month window in s.11(6) above comes in.

Note the boundary: s.11(2)(c) names s.5(2)(a), (b) and s.5(4). It does not name s.5(2)(c), the power to order a lump sum — so the lump sum itself is not variable under s.11, though the s.5(4) instalment terms on which it is paid are.

• In [2023] HKFC 231 (Family Court, 2023) — the parents had settled their divorce by a consent order in 2015, but the order specified no monthly figure, and for years each side understood it differently. The mother applied in 2020 for a specified HK$19,000 a month plus backdated payments of about HK$601,649. After reviewing both parents' incomes and the child's expenses, the court held the father liable for a 50% share: HK$7,550 a month until the child reaches 18 or commences full-time tertiary education, whichever is the later; and if the child does start tertiary education, HK$13,565 a month (again 50%). The backdating claim was refused — the court noted backdating is discretionary, and found that the borrowings on the mother's side were at best soft loans. The court also ordered the father to pay the education fund (US$18,656.97) directly to the child at 18.

Two very practical reminders from that case (both past-tense facts): a vaguely-drafted consent order can put you back in court a decade later arguing over its words; and backdating is not automatic — in that case, the court exercised its discretion to refuse it.

5. When payments stopped: the enforcement ladder, from pay-docking to prison

The decided cases show a court toolbox that escalates step by step. The first rung, and the "add money" part, are written into the Ordinances. The last two rungs are not.

Step one: the Attachment of Income Order. In [2025] HKFC 27, the court found reasonable grounds to believe the father would not pay in full and on time, and — of its own motion, without the mother applying — made an attachment of income order under the Attachment of Income Order Rules (Cap. 13A): the father's employer must pay the monthly maintenance directly to the mother, with a penal notice endorsed on the order.

That is exactly how the section is drafted. Cap. 13, s.20 is headed "Attachment of income to satisfy order". The threshold in s.20(1)(a)(ii) is that "a court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the payer will not make full and punctual payment in compliance with the maintenance order"; but that reasonable-grounds finding is not enough on its own — s.20(1)(b) also requires "there is any income capable of being attached payable to the payer". And "own motion" is the statute's own phrase — s.20(2B): "An attachment order may be made by the court on its own motion or on the application by the maintenance payer or the designated payee or both." Section 20(1A) adds that in deciding whether those reasonable grounds exist the court "shall take into account all the circumstances of the case", including the payer's past record and conduct in discharging financial obligations and "the risk of the payer dissipating his or her property". Cap. 192, s.28 and Cap. 16, s.9A carry exactly the same heading, and the Attachment of Income Order Rules (Cap. 13A) state their own enabling authority at the head of the Rules as "(Cap. 13, section 20(6), Cap. 16, section 9A(6) and Cap. 192, section 28(6))" — so all three routes end up docking pay under one set of rules. (Note that Cap. 192 s.28(6) is drafted differently from the other two: it opens "Rules made under section 32 may, in relation to proceedings under subsection (1), make provision for—", so the rule-making power in Cap. 192 is in s.32. The Rules nonetheless cite the three provisions as above.)

That rung carries a criminal penalty of its own, aimed at the payer. Rule 11 of Cap. 13A is headed "Offences and penalty". Rule 11(1) opens "A maintenance payer who—" and lists the situations, among them "(a)fails, without reasonable excuse, to comply with an order of the court under rule 3C, 4 or 9(4);", closing: "commits an offence and is liable to a fine at level 2 and to imprisonment for 1 month." Rule 11(2) deals with the income source (the employer) and carries a level 2 fine only, with no imprisonment. The enabling provision is the same subsection in each parent Ordinance: Cap. 13 s.20(7), "Rules made under subsection (6) may provide that the contravention of any rule shall constitute an offence punishable by a fine at level 2 and by imprisonment for 1 month.", with Cap. 16 s.9A(7) in identical terms and Cap. 192 s.28(7) reading "Rules made for the purpose of subsection (6)…".

Adding money: interest and surcharge. Each of the three Ordinances carries a matching pair of provisions with identical headings. On the divorce route (Cap. 192):

• Section 28AA, "Interest on arrears of maintenance" — where the payer "fails to make full and punctual payment in compliance with the maintenance order", "the judgment creditor is entitled to interest in respect of arrears of maintenance which accrue on or after the commencement date." (s.28AA(2)). Note the limit inside the provision: the commencement date for s.28AA is 1 May 2005, so interest runs only on arrears accruing on or after that date. The judgment debtor is not without a say: s.28AA(7) lets a debtor who "considers that he has reasonable grounds not to pay the interest" apply by summons to the court not to pay it, and s.28AA(8) has the court decide whether the interest is payable at all, and if so how much, having regard to all the circumstances.
• Section 28AB, "Surcharge on arrears of maintenance" — where the payer, "without reasonable excuse, repeatedly fails to make full and punctual payment", the court may on the payee's application order a surcharge. As with interest, the surcharge reaches only arrears "which accrue on or after the commencement date" (s.28AB(1)) — s.28AA(1) defines that term "In this section and section 28AB", so the same 1 May 2005 date is the starting line for the surcharge too. The cap is explicit (s.28AB(11)): "Subject to subsection (13), the amount of surcharge payable by the judgment debtor under subsection (1) shall not exceed 100% of the total arrears of maintenance calculated from the date on which the arrears first accrued to the date of payment of the surcharge." That qualifier matters: s.28AB(13) changes the calculation's start date where arrears more than 12 months old have been admitted into the reckoning with the court's s.12 leave.

The unmarried route has the exact counterpart: Cap. 13, s.20A, "Interest on arrears of maintenance", and s.20B, "Surcharge on arrears of maintenance", where s.20B(11) likewise caps the surcharge at "100% of the total arrears of maintenance". Cap. 16's equivalents are ss.9B and 9C, under the same headings.

The payee has a clock of their own. Cap. 192, s.12 is headed "Payment of certain arrears unenforceable without the leave of the court". Section 12(1) provides that a person "shall not be entitled to enforce through the court the payment of any arrears due under an order made by virtue of section 3, 4(1), 5(2), 8(5) or 8(6) without the leave of the court if those arrears became due more than 12 months before proceedings to enforce the payment of them are begun". One of the provisions named in that list is section 5(2) — the child maintenance provision — so that 12-month threshold applies directly to arrears of child maintenance.

And the next subsection carries something both sides need to know: on hearing that leave application the court is not confined to granting or refusing it — it can wipe the arrears out. Section 12(2): "The court hearing an application for the grant of leave under this section may refuse leave, or may grant leave subject to such restrictions and conditions (including conditions as to the allowing of time for payment of the making of payment by instalments) as that court think proper, or may remit the payment of such arrears or of any part thereof." So arrears more than 12 months old are not necessarily recoverable in full: s.12(2) expressly allows the court to remit them in whole or in part. (The application is made "in such manner as may be prescribed by rules of court" — s.12(3).)

Step two: the judgment summons. The defaulting payer is summoned to court to account for their financial position and explain the non-payment.

Step three: committal to prison — the last resort. In [2025] HKCA 376 (Court of Appeal, 2025) — a payer breached a consent-order undertaking to pay the child's school fees; arrears stood at HK$111,757 when the application was made, with school fees of HK$11,910 a month still running. The Court of Appeal held the payee may choose committal proceedings or a judgment summons; the 8-week suspended prison sentence was upheld, and the payer ultimately paid HK$206,807 to purge the contempt, with costs on an indemnity basis. In [2026] HKCFA 5 (Court of Final Appeal Appeal Committee, 2026), the Appeal Committee refused leave to appeal, holding the contrary argument — that committal is available only through a judgment summons — not reasonably arguable, in light of paragraph 54 of the Court of Appeal's judgment in YBL v LWC and Practice Direction PDSL10.2. The Appeal Committee set out that paragraph: "If a judgment creditor already has sufficient information to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment debtor has the means to pay, he should apply directly for committal of the judgment debtor." So a payee who can already prove the point may apply directly for committal, without first going through the examination stage of a judgment summons. And in the earlier case, once the arrears were paid and the contempt purged, the suspended committal was set aside in accordance with the terms of its own suspension.

Keep this distinction: the procedural rules for steps two and three — the judgment summons and committal — are not in the three Ordinances above. Those Ordinances deal with attachment of income, interest, surcharge and the s.12 leave requirement. Imprisonment is not wholly absent from them: Cap. 13A r.11(1) is an offence carrying one month's imprisonment aimed at the maintenance payer — but it punishes breach of the attachment-of-income procedure, not non-payment as a contempt. The procedural basis for a judgment summons and for committal comes, on the two judgments' own account, from rules of court and a practice direction (the judgments refer to Orders 48, 49B and 52 of the Rules of the High Court, r.87 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, and Practice Direction PDSL10.2).

The imprisonment layer itself, though, has a general provision in the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336), s.52D, headed "No arrest or imprisonment without order". Three points bear directly on a reader. Section 52D(1): "Subject to section 52E, a person shall not be arrested or imprisoned to enforce, secure or pursue a civil claim for the payment of money or damages except under an order of Court; and the Court shall have jurisdiction to make such an order for arrest or imprisonment only to enforce, secure or pursue a judgment for the payment of a specified sum of money." Section 52D(2): "An order for imprisonment under subsection (1) shall be for a period not exceeding 3 months" — a period that "may be amended by resolution of the Legislative Council" (s.52D(3)). And s.52D(5) expressly preserves the other route: the section "shall not affect any jurisdiction of the Court to make orders of committal in relation to— (a) contempt of court; or (b) disobedience of a judgment or order of the Court" — the jurisdiction used in both cases above. Section 52E of the same Ordinance is not merely a travel-ban provision: alongside its prohibition orders stopping a debtor leaving Hong Kong, s.52E(7)–(8) carry their own, separate arrest and imprisonment machinery — allowing a warrantless arrest by "any immigration officer, police officer or bailiff" for breach of a prohibition order, with imprisonment lasting until the prohibition order lapses or is discharged, not capped at 3 months as under s.52D(2).

For the full context of the enforcement cases (together with the asset-division framework), see the matrimonial-finance case article .

A note on CSSA: under the Social Welfare Department's Guide to CSSA, assessable income for CSSA purposes includes maintenance payments received; where payments under a maintenance order are not being received, the Guide also provides that the payee is generally expected to seek enforcement (subject to accepted exceptions). For how the two interact in detail, enquire with the Social Welfare Department.

Quick reference table

The question many people ask: is there a formula I can run myself?

No. The statute supplies no proportion, and a percentage in a judgment is that case's conclusion. But two things can be worked out: what a known needs figure becomes once a known share is applied to it, and what the statutory ceiling on arrears comes to. Both are arithmetic, not prediction.

Working the numbers

Every calculation below runs on figures already cited in this article, or on the statutory ceilings quoted above.

(1) The same "need", at different shares

The monthly need assessed in [2025] HKFC 27 was HK$27,000, and the father was held responsible for 80%:

• HK$27,000 × 80% = HK$21,600; with that case's HK$3,000 carer's allowance, HK$24,600 a month in total (those two are the second-stage order, once the mother returns to work; the first stage is HK$16,000 + HK$10,000 = HK$26,000).
• Take the same HK$27,000 need at the 50% share seen in [2023] HKFC 231 (this step carries one case's percentage across to another case's needs figure as an illustration by this site; no court decided it): HK$27,000 × 50% = HK$13,500.
• The gap: HK$21,600 − HK$13,500 = HK$8,100 a month, which over a year is HK$8,100 × 12 = HK$97,200.

In one line: moving the share by 30 percentage points, on a need of HK$27,000 a month, is close to a hundred thousand dollars a year. That is why the "means" part is argued on documents rather than assertions — and documents are exactly what s.7(2) and Cap. 13, s.10(2) require the court to have regard to.

(2) The annual figure, and the line at 18

• [2025] HKFC 46, HK$15,000 a month per child: over a year, HK$15,000 × 12 = HK$180,000.
• [2023] HKFC 231 stepped up from HK$7,550 to HK$13,565 at the tertiary stage: HK$6,015 more a month, or HK$6,015 × 12 = HK$72,180 more a year. That step exists at all only because Cap. 192, s.10(3)(a) and Cap. 13, s.12A(3)(a) allow an order to run past 18 where the child is or will be "receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation".

(3) The statutory ceiling on arrears

Take the HK$11,910 monthly school fees in [2025] HKCA 376:

• Twelve months unpaid is HK$11,910 × 12 = HK$142,920.
• The surcharge cap in s.28AB(11) (Cap. 13, s.20B(11) on the unmarried route) is 100% of the total arrears — so a surcharge could add a further HK$142,920, bringing the maximum payable to HK$285,840, before any interest under s.28AA (or Cap. 13, s.20A).
• Applied to that case's arrears of HK$111,757 at the date of the application: a surcharge of up to HK$111,757 more, a maximum of HK$223,514.
• Meanwhile s.12 runs the other way for the payee: once arrears have been due for more than 12 months, enforcing them needs the court's leave first.

(Item (3) is worked from the statutory ceiling to show how s.28AB(11) operates; it is not the outcome of any decided case. None of the calculations above is an assessment of any individual reader's case.)