Home›Guides›Sacked on the Spot and Paid Nothing: What Section 9 Says, Who Has to Prove It, and Where It Goes Next
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On this page37 sections
  1. 1The question many people ask: he called it summary dismissal and paid nothing — can he do that?
  2. 21. What section 9 says: *may*, not *must* — and paragraph (b) is an open door
  3. 3Why has this section not moved in nearly sixty years?
  4. 4And the version you are most likely to read is a shorter section 9
  5. 52. Who has to produce the evidence? The Ordinance gives no general answer — but it answers three times
  6. 6How wide the silence is, and what it cannot answer
  7. 7The one general onus the Ordinance does allocate is on the employer — and it is about something else
  8. 8The three express allocations, each confined to a class
  9. 9So what does support it for an ordinary summary dismissal?
  10. 103. What a court actually did: one judgment, and the judge said it was not an easy call
  11. 11The nine principles you will read everywhere are the judge quoting a textbook
  12. 12A heavy burden of proof is not in the judgment
  13. 13The most counter-intuitive finding: the employer **did** ask, repeatedly, and still lost
  14. 14Neither side may over-read it, and that limit is in the judgment itself
  15. 15What was awarded — and why one case's figure is not a benchmark
  16. 164. If it was not lawfully summary, what you were short-paid
  17. 17Even a summary dismissal that stands does not mean nothing is payable — and the Ordinance sets a seven-day deadline
  18. 18Notice: section 6(2) — and section 6(2) is not the whole of section 6
  19. 19Payment in lieu: section 7(1A) — and the three subsections that govern the same calculation
  20. 20Working the provisions
  21. 21Severance and long service payment: why you may be conflating them
  22. 22If the employer has gone under
  23. 235. Where this gets decided: the Labour Department, the Labour Tribunal — and a door you have not been told about
  24. 24The names first, because the names are themselves a problem
  25. 25What is not optional is the certificate, not the conciliation
  26. 26What is signed at conciliation has the force of an award
  27. 27What you exchange by going to the Tribunal
  28. 28No ceiling; but there is a floor, and it is not written as a dollar figure in any section of Cap. 25
  29. 29The third door: the Tribunal can send the case away, for any reason
  30. 30What the published waiting times measure, and what they do not
  31. 31How many people go this way — and one number that is not a success rate
  32. 326. Time limits: more than one clock — and the most general answer is in the Limitation Ordinance, not the Labour Tribunal Ordinance
  33. 337. How other places do it — and why English formulations do not simply transfer
  34. 34Frequently Asked Questions
  35. 35Next Steps
  36. 36Sources
  37. 37雙語條文對照/Bilingual provision index

Sacked on the Spot and Paid Nothing: What Section 9 Says, Who Has to Prove It, and Where It Goes Next

Published: 2026-08-30

The question many people ask: he called it summary dismissal and paid nothing — can he do that?

That question is not one issue among several. It is the gate to every other one. Section 8(b) of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) expressly preserves the section 9 right, which means the notice periods in section 6 and the payment-in-lieu formula in section 7 are not in issue at all until section 9 is decided. While the employer's characterisation stands, there is no notice and no payment in lieu. If it falls, sections 6 and 7 come back into play, and section 8A fixes the sum the terminating party must pay: an amount equal to what termination in accordance with section 7 would have required. ⚠ That sentence needs a qualification in the same breath: notice and payment in lieu are what sections 6 and 7 would have required. Where section 6 required none — most commonly during the first month of an employment expressly agreed to be on probation, under sections 6(3)(a) and 6(3A)(a) — the failure of the section 9 characterisation does not conjure them. Section 4 below. The decision section 9 puts in front of a dismissed employee is not whether to be angry. It is whether to challenge the characterisation.

The thirty-second version

  • Where the rule is, and which word it uses. Cap. 57, section 9. The operative word in section 9(1) is may — the section confers a right, not an automatic gate the employer walks through by ticking a list.
  • The four grounds in section 9(1)(a) are not the whole of section 9. Section 9(1)(b) is an open residual limb that imports the common-law grounds on which a contract may be terminated without notice. The Labour Department's own 78-page guide never prints it.
  • Who has to prove it? The Ordinance contains no general provision allocating that burden. It allocates one three times only, each for a defined class — pregnant employees, employees dismissed on a paid sickness day, and Part VI A. For an ordinary summary dismissal: the Judiciary tells Labour Tribunal litigants the defendant bears it; the Law Reform Commission wrote the same in 2010; three law firms state it and none of the three mentions the 2025 judgment discussed in section 3, two of them writing in 2016 and 2021, before it existed; and in 2025 a deputy judge of the Court of First Instance put it on the employer and found it undischarged — while writing, in the paragraph immediately before, that he did not find the case easy to decide.
  • Two doors — but no statutory order between them. Labour Department conciliation, and the Labour Tribunal. ⚠ What the law requires is a certificate, not that you conciliate first: Cap. 25 section 15(1) says the tribunal shall not hear a claim until a conciliation certificate is filed — and limb (a) of that same subsection contemplates a party refusing to take part, with the certificate issuing anyway. A separate document does something else: where conciliation produces a written settlement and that settlement is filed under section 15(8), section 15(9) provides that it is treated for all purposes as if it were an award of the tribunal. That is the settlement, not the certificate.
  • And a third door you have probably not been told about. Cap. 25 sections 10(1) and 10(2) let the Tribunal decline jurisdiction at any stage, for any reason, and transfer the claim to the Court of First Instance, the District Court or the Small Claims Tribunal. The 2025 judgment in section 3 left the Labour Tribunal for the High Court in exactly that way.

Scope: below are the provisions quoted, what the judgments quoted actually decided, and what the official documents actually say. Whether a dismissal was lawful, whether to bring a claim, whether to accept an offer, and what the chances are all depend on the whole of the facts.

1. What section 9 says: may, not must — and paragraph (b) is an open door

Section 9 is not a checklist an employer completes to avoid paying. It confers a right, and the grounds it lists are not the whole of it.

The opening words of section 9(1):

"An employer may terminate a contract of employment without notice or payment in lieu—"

The Chinese authentic text reads 「如有以下情況,僱主可無須給予通知或代通知金而終止僱傭合約 ——」

Then paragraph (a) — the four grounds everyone has heard of:

"(a)if an employee, in relation to his employment—(i)wilfully disobeys a lawful and reasonable order;(ii)misconducts himself, such conduct being inconsistent with the due and faithful discharge of his duties;(iii)is guilty of fraud or dishonesty; or(iv)is habitually neglectful in his duties; or"

*Note where the word or falls, after (iv)* — the section lists four things and then joins paragraph (b) to them with it. Paragraph (b) follows:

"on any other ground on which he would be entitled to terminate the contract without notice at common law."

So paragraph (b) is not a fifth ground. It is a residual limb that brings inside the section the common-law grounds on which a contract may be terminated without notice — the grounds, not every other question the common law governs. *(The same English words appear twice in Cap. 57: the second occurrence is section 10(c), the employee's mirror right — section 8(b) preserves the right of a party, not of the employer alone.)*

Section 9(2) adds one express limit:

"The fact that an employee takes part in a strike does not entitle his employer to terminate under subsection (1) the employee’s contract of employment."

This site's reading (sections 9(1), 9(1)(a), 9(1)(b) and 9(2) read together): the four grounds in paragraph (a) are not an exhaustive list. Across the whole of section 9, nothing anywhere in it says the grounds are limited to those listed — and paragraph (b) expressly brings in the common-law grounds on which a contract may be ended without notice.

Why has this section not moved in nearly sixty years?

Because paragraph (b) means it does not have to. Section 9 has been amended by exactly one Ordinance since 1968 — 51 of 2000, which added the strike provision above and left paragraphs (a) and (b) untouched. Compare the section immediately beside it: section 6, on notice, has been amended by eight separate Ordinances since 1970 (5 of 1970, 44 of 1971, 57 of 1983, 48 of 1984, 55 of 1987, 53 of 1990, 103 of 1995, 7 of 2001).

The 1968 Objects and Reasons to the Employment Bill record that what is now section 9 set out in detail a right to dismiss for cause that already existed in the proviso to section 5 of the predecessor Ordinance — so the section was a codification of an existing common-law right from its first day. The one legislative attempt to change the test, the Unfair Dismissal Bill introduced by Mr LEUNG Yiu-chung, was negatived at Second Reading on 26 June 1997 by 24 votes to 32.

And the version you are most likely to read is a shorter section 9

The Labour Department's Concise Guide to the Employment Ordinance (December 2025 edition; 78 pages English, 64 Chinese) gives four grounds for summary dismissal. From end to end, the guide never mentions the common law and never mentions section 9. The guide also shortens the misconduct ground by dropping the statutory qualifier. Separately, at least one published practitioner restatement of paragraph (b) prints with notice where the Ordinance reads without notice.

Why this matters. Not because anyone was careless. Because a reader who reads a summary of section 9 is reading a shorter section than the one that governs them — and the half that goes missing is the half that has kept the section unamended for fifty-eight years.

Being outside the four does not mean the employer loses, and it does not mean the employer wins. It means the argument runs through paragraph (b), and paragraph (b) is the common law, not the Ordinance.

2. Who has to produce the evidence? The Ordinance gives no general answer — but it answers three times

Cap. 57 contains no general provision allocating the burden of proving a summary dismissal, and the legislature has expressly allocated one three times, each time for a defined class. The contrast is half the answer.

How wide the silence is, and what it cannot answer

No general provision of Cap. 57 allocates the burden of proving a summary dismissal. ⚠ That is a fact about the statute and nothing more: Cap. 57 is enacted law, and the answer to this question lives in the common law that section 9(1)(b) brings in — so its absence from the Ordinance does not mean Hong Kong law has no answer.

The one general onus the Ordinance does allocate is on the employer — and it is about something else

"(2)In any dispute as to whether a contract of employment is a continuous contract the onus of proving that it is not a continuous contract shall be on the employer."

The Chinese authentic text reads 「(2)在僱傭合約是否連續性合約的爭議中,僱主須承擔證明該合約並非連續性合約的舉證責任。」

That is about whether the contract was continuous, not about summary dismissal. And in the same 1968 Objects and Reasons, the draftsman allocated an onus expressly, by name, for the clause that is now section 3(2) — on the employer — and allocated none for the summary-dismissal clause. The record shows one allocation made by name, and none made next to it.

The three express allocations, each confined to a class

The first two: pregnant employees (section 15(1B)) and employees dismissed on a paid sickness day (section 33(4BAA)), both added by 7 of 2001.

"(1B)An employer who terminates the continuous contract of employment of a pregnant employee shall be taken for the purposes of subsection (1)(a) or (b) to terminate the contract otherwise than in accordance with section 9—(a)unless the contrary is proved; or(b)subject to subsection (1C), unless the employer proves that—(i)he purported to terminate the contract in accordance with that section; and(ii)at the time of such termination, he reasonably believed that he had a ground to do so."

Then a calibration almost nobody states correctly. Section 15(1C):

"(1C)Subsection (1B)(b) shall not apply in the case of civil proceedings."

Only limb (b) is switched off. So in civil proceedings — the Labour Tribunal included — the employer loses the reasonable-belief escape route, while limb (a), "unless the contrary is proved", survives and keeps operating against the employer there. Section 33(4BAB) does exactly the same for the sickness-day presumption. Two common shorthands — that the reverse burden does not apply in the Tribunal, and that the presumption disappears there — are both wrong.

The third: Part VI A (Employment Protection). And here the gateway has to be stated first, because it is itself a filter. Section 32A(1)(a):

"(a)where he has been employed under a continuous contract for a period of not less than 24 months ending with the relevant date and he is dismissed by the employer because the employer intends to extinguish or reduce any right, benefit or protection conferred or to be conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance;"

The presumption that follows operates only "for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)" — so an employee with less than 24 months' continuous service does not reach it at all. Section 32A(2):

"(2)For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), an employee who has been dismissed by the employer shall, unless a valid reason is shown for that dismissal within the meaning of section 32K, be taken to have been so dismissed because the employer intends to extinguish or reduce any right, benefit or protection conferred or to be conferred upon the employee by this Ordinance."

read with the opening words of section 32K:

"For the purposes of this Part, it shall be a valid reason for the employer to show that the dismissal of the employee or the variation of the terms of the contract of employment with the employee was by the reason of—"

And this is now the Court of Final Appeal's own language, not a commentator's. In FACV 2/2005 (Court of Final Appeal, judgment 4 November 2005, on appeal from CACV 253/2002; Bokhary PJ gave the judgment):

"So the employer who relies on the dismissed employee's conduct has to show that the dismissal "was by the reason of" such conduct."

"s.32A(2) provides that the employer is taken to have so intended unless he shows a valid reason for dismissal within the meaning of s.32K."

The scope is the whole point: this is the Part VI A allocation, not the section 9 one. Part VI A is a separate route with its own gateway and its own time limits — see unreasonable vs unlawful dismissal .

This site's reading (sections 3, 6–9, 15, 32A and 32K read together): the legislature knows how to put an employer to proof about section 9. It has done so three times, each time for a named class, and it has calibrated which limb survives in which forum. For everyone else the Ordinance is silent — and what fills that silence is the common law that paragraph (b) has already imported.

So what does support it for an ordinary summary dismissal?

Item by item:

  • The Judiciary. Its general guidelines for preparation for trial in the Labour Tribunal — three pages, published in both languages — tell litigants that in most cases the claimant bears the burden of proof, that in cases of summary dismissal the defendant bears it, and that a party who fails to adduce sufficient evidence at trial to discharge it will most likely fail. Both sentences have to be read: the same claimant will usually also be claiming wages, holiday pay and annual leave pay, and on that document the burden on those is theirs.
  • The Law Reform Commission. In a footnote to a February 2010 report, the LRC wrote that where an employer terminates a contract summarily the onus is on the employer to prove that the dismissal was made according to one of the grounds set out in section 9. And it qualified itself in the very next paragraph: given the wide variety of circumstances that can arise, there is no simple answer to whether a summary dismissal is justified unless the full facts and circumstances of the case are examined.
  • Practitioners — counting independence rather than volume. Three firms state the burden, and none of the three cites a Hong Kong authority for it: one cites an English contract-law textbook and a UK employment-appeal decision, another says only that case law suggests it and names no case. They are independent assertions rather than independent authority. The 2016 piece also says the decided cases are not often held for the employer — one firm's view, not a statistic.
  • A 2025 Hong Kong judgment. Section 3 below.

This site's reading (the four items above read with sections 7 to 9): that the burden falls on the employer is consistently stated by the Judiciary, by the Law Reform Commission, by independent practitioners and by one first-instance judgment applying it. It is not stated by section 9 of the Ordinance, and the judgment discussed here is a decision at first instance, given by a deputy judge.

You will still have to prepare your own side of it. But on every source above, the party that has to produce it first is not you.

3. What a court actually did: one judgment, and the judge said it was not an easy call

A Hong Kong Court of First Instance judgment put the burden on the employer and found it undischarged — and the paragraph immediately before that finding records that the judge did not find it easy. Both sentences have to be read; reading one of them alone gets it wrong.

The case: [2025] HKCFI 2484, HCA 1135/2019, Court of First Instance, judgment 18 June 2025, after six hearing days (19–21, 24, 25 and 28 February 2025). The judgment was given by a deputy judge of the Court of First Instance — which matters wherever weight of authority is the point.

The judge's own words, at paragraphs 98 and 99:

"I have given careful consideration to the evidence and arguments in this case, and I do not find it easy to decide whether there was sufficient to justify D's summary dismissal of P."

"However, on balance I am persuaded by P's arguments. I conclude that D has not discharged its burden of showing that the threshold for summary dismissal was crossed."

The nine principles you will read everywhere are the judge quoting a textbook

This is worth taking slowly, because the nine points circulate very widely as the court's own. The framing sentence is at paragraph 94:

"I am assisted by the broad summary of the principles on summary dismissal in Employment Law and Practice in Hong Kong, 2nd Edition, 2016, including the following:"

Note the last two words. The judge neither adopts the summary nor says it is complete. And the end of the first of the nine points is the sentence most often quoted:

"The onus of proof is on the employer to establish that summary dismissal is justified"

In the judgment, each of the nine points carries the textbook's own paragraph references (running from 6.105 to 6.129), and the widely circulated version carries none of them. So: what circulates as the court's summary of principle is a judge reciting a 2016 practitioner textbook. What is the court's own is paragraph 99 — and paragraph 99 is a finding about a party, not a general rule.

A heavy burden of proof is not in the judgment

The judgment nowhere describes the burden as heavy. The word burden appears only in the judge's own operative sentence at paragraph 99; onus appears only in the textbook recital.

What the judge says about the standard in his own voice is at paragraph 100(4):

"The standard of proof for fraud is commensurate with the seriousness of the allegation. Inferences of fraud or serious misconduct are not lightly drawn."

This site's reading (paragraphs 94(3) and 100(4) read together): not a heavier burden — the ordinary civil one, with evidence proportionate to the seriousness of what is alleged. The phrase balance of probabilities appears three times in the judgment: once inside the textbook recital and twice where the judge applies it to his own findings of fact. He never uses the phrase in his own voice about the summary-dismissal standard. And "heavy" appears in neither place.

The most counter-intuitive finding: the employer did ask, repeatedly, and still lost

The judgment records that the employer put the allegation to the employee several times:

"especially where D had asked P several times to explain the impugned invoices but never received a reasonable answer"

and the Termination Letter itself relied on the failure to explain as a ground under section 9(1)(a)(i). The judge accepted the employee's explanation was incomplete and still held it insufficient:

"I am not persuaded that this omission in his explanation is sufficient to cross the high threshold for summary dismissal."

So what did tell against the employer? This should not be guessed at, because the judge set out his own list. Paragraph 100 opens:

"My central reasons are as follows."

Every one of the six that follow is a fact about the workplace, and none is about the conduct of the litigation: (1) the judge found as a fact that the employee incurred genuine family expenses every month and could have submitted invoices for them under the contract, so he had nothing to gain; (2) he found that the conversation with a manager acting with the employer's apparent authority did happen, and at least gave the employee reasonable cause to believe the approach was acceptable; (3) the invoices were checked by the employer's own staff, including Chinese-speaking staff, and paid; (4) the standard of proof for fraud is commensurate with the seriousness of the allegation, and the judge was not persuaded to that standard that the employee acted dishonestly; (5) viewed objectively and against a more usual fact-set the use of the invoices was highly irregular, called for serious explanation and could justify summary dismissal in an appropriate case; and (6) on these unusual facts the most likely factual scenario was one without dishonest intent.

The litigation-conduct points are in the judgment too — but they are not on that list. The allegation that the invoices were fabricated

"was not put to P under questioning, nor was there any evidence from a forensic expert or from the hotel"

— that is, it was never put in cross-examination and was supported by no forensic or hotel evidence; the criminal characterisation was raised only in closing submissions (paragraph 106); and a witness statement was filed for a key witness who did not attend to give evidence.

This site's reading: the way the employer ran the case did it no good — but the six reasons the judge himself called central are six findings about how the workplace was run. A reading on which the employer lost the litigation rather than the argument is not supported by the judgment's own list.

Neither side may over-read it, and that limit is in the judgment itself

Paragraph 104:

"I think that in more usual circumstances, that a COO would consider it acceptable to submit invoices for family expenses which did not in fact relate to family expenses incurred, may well be sufficient to justify loss of confidence warranting summary dismissal."

"However, I reiterate that the facts are very usual: given the conversation with ZL and the subsequent checking of invoices by D and approval for payment, I am again not persuaded that summary dismissal was justified"

Both sentences have to be quoted. The first is a hypothetical; the second is the judge declining, in the same paragraph, to apply it to this case.

So the judgment forbids reading it as predictable in either direction. And one further bound: the judgment cites no Hong Kong authority on the test. It cites four decisions in all: three of them Hong Kong reported — a 2015 Court of Final Appeal decision, cited on assumption of responsibility; a 2022 Court of Final Appeal decision, cited on what makes an instrument false under the Crimes Ordinance; and the 2020 interlocutory decision in this same action, in a footnote — and one English decision from 1967, which is the only one of the four cited on the summary-dismissal test at all. None of the four is cited for where the burden lies.

And the court accepted the 1967 proposition — which runs against the employee, and has to be said. Paragraph 105:

"I accept that proposition, the application of which is fact-sensitive."

The proposition is that conduct short of dishonesty may be sufficient to justify summary dismissal where it is of a grave and weighty character undermining the confidence that should exist between employer and employee. It was advanced by the party that lost, and the judge accepted it.

What was awarded — and why one case's figure is not a benchmark

The round figure that circulates is not the court's. The judgment states no total and applies no exchange rate: it enters judgment by reference to its own itemised heads at paragraph 119, one of which — service fees under a Service Agreement — was expressly not awarded. The counterclaim was dismissed; interest and costs were ordered nisi.

More importantly, the measure of loss was not a notice period. Paragraph 12:

"The Employment Agreement provided for a fixed three-year term of employment, which could not be terminated before expiry on 31 May 2020, except for good cause"

So the loss was measured over the balance of the unexpired fixed term, not over a notice period, because the contract could not be ended early except for good cause. How far that measure was actually applied is a separate question the judgment answers separately: the one head claimed over exactly the unexpired term — service fees under the Service Agreement from 1 September 2018 to 31 May 2020 — was the head expressly not awarded, and one head that was awarded runs from 1 January 2018, eight months before the dismissal. Where section 6 would have required notice, the sum section 8A(1) fixes is the amount termination in accordance with section 7 would have required — the notice-period figure (section 4 below). That case's figures turn on its own contract and facts and are not a benchmark for anyone else's.

4. If it was not lawfully summary, what you were short-paid

*Notice and payment in lieu are not a separate argument. They are what begins once section 9 is decided. Section 8 — headed Saving of rights — says so, and the lead-in has to be read with the limb, because paragraph (b) alone states the opposite of what the section does:*

"Nothing in section 6 or 7 shall be taken—(a)to prevent either party to a contract of employment from waiving, at the time notice is required to be given for the purposes of section 6(2), (3) or (3A), his right to notice or to payment in lieu of notice; (b)to affect the right of a party to a contract of employment to terminate the contract without notice or payment in lieu under section 9, 10 or 11(2)."

The Chinese authentic text reads 「第6或7條的任何規定,不得用於 ——(a)阻止僱傭合約的任何一方,在因第6(2)、(3)或(3A)條的規定須給予通知時,放棄獲給予通知或代通知金的權利;(b)影響僱傭合約的任何一方根據第9、10或11(2)條不給予通知或代通知金而終止合約的權利。」

So nothing in sections 6 and 7 cuts down section 9; section 9 is saved from them. Which means that while the employer's characterisation stands, neither calculation below is reached at all.

*And there is a provision that says what is payable once the characterisation fails — Cap. 57 s. 8A, headed Damages for wrongful termination of contract:*

"(1) Without prejudice to section 9, 10 or 11(2), where a contract of employment is terminated otherwise than in accordance with section 6 or 7, a sum equal to the amount of wages that would have been payable had the contract been terminated in accordance with section 7 shall be payable by the party terminating the contract to the other party."

The Chinese authentic text reads 「(1)在不損害第9、10或11(2)條的規定下,凡僱傭合約並非按照第6或7條終止者,終止合約的一方須付給對方一筆款項,款額相等於假若該合約是按照第7條終止則本須支付的工資額。」

*Read the opening words: "Without prejudice to section 9". s. 8A does not decide whether the dismissal was lawfully summary — s. 9 does. What it does is state the consequence when the contract was ended otherwise than under s. 6 or s. 7: a sum equal to what s. 7 would have required. s. 8A(3) also fixes how the average is computed where no notice was given at all — by reference to the date of termination rather than a date of notice that does not exist. This article states the provision and does not calculate any reader's entitlement.*

Even a summary dismissal that stands does not mean nothing is payable — and the Ordinance sets a seven-day deadline

The Ordinance has no rule that an employee is "paid nothing". A section 9 characterisation that stands removes notice and payment in lieu. It does not remove wages already earned, and it does not remove other sums due to the employee.

*The provision is Cap. 57 section 25, headed Payment on termination:*

"(1)Subject to section 31O, where a contract of employment is terminated any sum due to the employee shall be paid to him as soon as is practicable and in any case not later than 7 days after the day of termination."

Section 25(2) says which sums subsection (1) is about:

"(2)The sum referred to in subsection (1) shall be—(a)the equivalent of the amount earned by the employee for work done over the period commencing on the expiry of his wage period next preceding the time of termination up to that time;(b)the sum (if any) payable under sections 7, 15(2) and 33(4BA); (ba)any long service payment due to the employee; and (c)any other sum due to the employee in respect of his contract of employment."

Taken limb by limb: (a) is what the employee earned for work done from the expiry of the last wage period up to termination — the final unpaid pay run; (b) is the sum payable under sections 7, 15(2) and 33(4BA) — that is the payment-in-lieu limb, and it is the one that disappears while the section 9 characterisation stands; (ba) is any long service payment due; and (c) is any other sum due to the employee in respect of his contract of employment. Limbs (a), (ba) and (c) are a different question from whether section 9 holds.

Note the scope: section 25(2) is about sums that are due. Whether a particular reader is entitled to an end-of-year payment, pro-rata annual leave pay, a severance payment or a long service payment turns on the eligibility conditions in that contract and in the Ordinance. They have to be assessed case by case. (Severance and long service payment are covered in the two guides linked above.)

As for when: section 25(1) requires payment "as soon as is practicable and in any case not later than 7 days after the day of termination". Two further provisions hang off that seven-day rule:

  • Section 25A(1) — interest on late payment:

"(1)Subject to subsection (3), if any wages or any sum referred to in section 25(2)(a) are not paid within 7 days from the day on which they become due under sections 23, 24 and 25, the employer shall pay interest at the rate specified in subsection (2) on the outstanding amount of wages or sum from the date on which such wages or sum become due up to the date of actual payment."

Note its scope: it reaches wages and the sum referred to in section 25(2)(a), not every limb of section 25(2).

  • Section 63C — the offence:

"Any employer who wilfully and without reasonable excuse contravenes section 23, 24 or 25 commits an offence and is liable to a fine of $350,000 and to imprisonment for 3 years."

Notice: section 6(2) — and section 6(2) is not the whole of section 6

"(2)The length of notice required to terminate a contract of employment shall be—(a)in the case of a contract which is deemed by virtue of the provisions of section 5 to be a contract for 1 month renewable from month to month and which does not make provision for the length of notice required to terminate the contract, not less than 1 month; (b)in the case of a contract which is deemed by virtue of the provisions of section 5 to be a contract for 1 month renewable from month to month and which makes provision for the length of notice required to terminate the contract, the agreed period, but not less than 7 days; (c)in every other case, the agreed period, but not less than 7 days in the case of a continuous contract."

Section 6(1) says in its own opening words that subsection (2) is not the whole of it:

"(1)Subject to subsections (2), (2A), (2B), (3) and (3A) and sections 15 and 33, either party to a contract of employment may at any time terminate the contract by giving to the other party notice, orally or in writing, of his intention to do so."

The one that most affects a reader, and that summaries most often drop, is probation. Section 6(3) — where the contract makes no provision for notice:

"(3)Where in any contract of employment, whether in writing or oral, it has been expressly agreed that the employment is on probation and the contract does not make provision for the length of notice required for its termination such contract may be terminated—  (a)by either party at any time during the first month of such employment without notice or payment in lieu;(b)by either party at any time after the first month of such employment by giving to the other party notice of not less than 7 days."

Section 6(3A) — where it does — has the same structure:

"(3A)Where in any contract of employment, whether in writing or oral, it has been expressly agreed that the employment is on probation and the contract makes provision for the length of notice required for its termination such contract may be terminated—(a)notwithstanding the length of notice provided for in the contract, by either party at any time during the first month of such employment without notice or payment in lieu;(b)by either party at any time after the first month of such employment by giving to the other party notice of the agreed period, but not less than 7 days."

These are exceptions to section 6(2), not additions to it: where the employment is expressly agreed to be on probation, either party may terminate during the first month with no notice and no payment in lieu; only after the first month do the 7 days (or the agreed period, not less than 7 days) arrive. A person dismissed in the first month of a probationary contract who reads only section 6(2)(a) would conclude they were short-paid a month. On these subsections the Ordinance gives them nothing.

Two further subsections shorten the notice period itself: section 6(2A) provides that annual leave to which an employee is entitled under section 41AA is not included in the length of notice required under subsection (2), and section 6(2B) does the same for maternity leave under section 12.

Payment in lieu: section 7(1A) — and the three subsections that govern the same calculation

"(1A)Subject to sections 15 and 33, either party to a contract of employment may at any time terminate the contract without notice by agreeing to pay to the other party—(a)where the length of notice required to terminate the contract under section 6 is a period expressed in days or weeks, a sum calculated by multiplying the number of days in the period for which wages would normally be payable to the employee by the daily average of the wages earned by the employee during—(i)the period of 12 months immediately before the date on which the party terminating the contract gives notice of the termination to the other party (date of notification); or(ii)if the employee has been employed by the employer concerned for a period shorter than 12 months immediately before the date of notification, the shorter period; or(b)where the length of notice required to terminate the contract under section 6 is a period expressed in months, a sum calculated by multiplying the number of months required by the monthly average of the wages earned by the employee during—(i)the period of 12 months immediately before the date of notification; or(ii)if the employee has been employed by the employer concerned for a period shorter than 12 months immediately before the date of notification, the shorter period."

But section 7(1A) is not the whole of the arithmetic. Three more subsections of the same section govern how the average is taken.

Section 7(1B) — the periods, and the wages paid for them, that come out:

"(1B)In calculating the daily average or monthly average of the wages earned by an employee during the period of 12 months or the shorter period—(a)any period therein for which the employee was not paid his wages or full wages by reason of—(i)any maternity leave, paternity leave, rest day, sickness day, holiday or annual leave taken by the employee; (ii)any leave taken by the employee with the agreement of his employer;(iii)his not being provided by his employer with work on any normal working day; or(iv)his absence from work due to temporary incapacity for which compensation is payable under section 10 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282); and(b)any wages paid to him for the period referred to in paragraph (a), are to be disregarded."

Section 7(1D) — the substitute basis where subsection (1A) cannot practicably be used:

"(1D)Despite subsection (1A), if for any reason it is impracticable to calculate the daily average or monthly average of the wages earned by an employee in the manner provided in that subsection, the amount may be calculated by reference to the wages earned by a person who was employed at the same work by the same employer during the period of 12 months immediately before the date of notification, or, if there is no such person, by a person who was employed in the same trade or occupation and at the same work in the same district during the period of 12 months immediately before the date of notification."

Section 7(4) — when overtime pay counts as wages, and it overrides the rest of the Ordinance in terms:

"(4)For the purposes of this section, and notwithstanding any other provision of this Ordinance, the term wages (工資)—(a)includes overtime pay of a constant character or the monthly average of which over a period of 12 months (or if not applicable, such shorter period of employment) immediately preceding the date on which the termination takes effect is equivalent to or exceeds 20% of his monthly average wages during the same period;(b)except as provided in paragraph (a), shall be deemed not to include overtime pay."

The two authentic texts really are structured differently, and it is worth saying so: the English puts the operative words — "either party to a contract of employment may at any time terminate the contract without notice by agreeing to pay to the other party" — in the lead-in, while the Chinese repeats them inside paragraphs (a) and (b). The English quoted here is from the English text and the Chinese quoted in the Chinese section is from the Chinese text. Neither is a translation of the other.

Working the provisions

This is a reading of the formula, not anyone's entitlement.

  • Ask first whether it is probation. Where the employment is expressly agreed to be on probation, either party may terminate at any time during the first month with no notice and no payment in lieu (sections 6(3)(a) and 6(3A)(a)) — so that case never reaches the steps below. After the first month, it does.
  • Identify the contract. Deemed monthly-renewable with no agreed notice period → not less than 1 month. Deemed monthly-renewable with an agreed period → the agreed period, but not less than 7 days. Any other case → the agreed period, but not less than 7 days for a continuous contract (section 6(2)). Annual leave (section 6(2A)) and maternity leave (section 6(2B)) are not included in that period.
  • Identify the multiplier. Notice expressed in months → the number of months required × the monthly average of wages. Notice expressed in days or weeks → the number of days in the period for which wages would normally be payable × the daily average (section 7(1A)).
  • Identify the averaging window, and what comes out of it. The 12 months immediately before the date of notification, or, if the employee was employed for a shorter period than that, the shorter period (section 7(1A)(a)(i)–(ii) and (b)(i)–(ii)). Section 7(1B) then takes out maternity leave, paternity leave, rest days, sickness days, holidays, annual leave, leave taken with the employer's agreement, normal working days on which the employer provided no work, and absence through temporary incapacity compensable under Cap. 282 section 10 — together with any wages paid for those periods. If subsection (1A) cannot practicably be used at all, section 7(1D) allows the amount to be calculated by reference to a person employed at the same work by the same employer, or failing that in the same trade or occupation and at the same work in the same district.
  • Ask whether overtime counts. Section 7(4) applies notwithstanding any other provision of the Ordinance: overtime pay of a constant character, or overtime pay whose monthly average over the relevant period is equal to or more than 20% of the monthly average wages, is included in wages; otherwise overtime pay is deemed not to be included.
  • Identify the date of notification. The provision defines it itself: the date on which the party terminating the contract gives notice of the termination to the other party.

Note the opening qualifier of section 7(1A): "Subject to sections 15 and 33" — the pregnancy and sickness-day provisions run their own course, as section 2 above sets out.

Severance and long service payment: why you may be conflating them

Readers often treat payment in lieu of notice (代通知金), severance payment (遣散費) and long service payment (長期服務金) as one pot of money. The three sets of entitlements have different triggers, different eligibility and different arithmetic — see severance and long service payment and calculating them after the abolition of MPF offsetting .

If the employer has gone under

The proportion first: of the 12,940 claims the Labour Relations Division handled in 2024, cessation of business and insolvency accounted for 172 — 1.3%.

What the Fund is. Cap. 380 section 16(1) confers no right to be paid. It provides that where it appears to the Commissioner that an employer has failed to pay, and either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) is satisfied — (b) is the company case, where a winding-up petition has been presented; (a) is the non-company case, and paragraph (a) has two sub-limbs, taken below, then

"he may make an ex gratia payment to the applicant out of the Fund of the amount of the wages, wages in lieu of notice, severance payment, pay for untaken statutory holidays or pay for untaken annual leave, as the case may be, or all or any of them."

*So it is a discretion and what it pays is an ex gratia payment; and the general rule is that there must be a petition. But the petition is not an exceptionless precondition — the Ordinance opens two doors past it, and neither is theoretical.*

The first is inside paragraph (a) itself. Paragraph (a) has two sub-limbs, and the second reads:

"(ii)he would, but for the existence of section 6(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6), be liable to have a bankruptcy petition presented against him"

So where a bankruptcy petition could not be presented only because of the restriction in section 6(2)(a) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6), the Commissioner may still pay — and section 16(1A) requires him to give notice of the payment, and of his reasons for it, in the Gazette.

*The second is section 18, headed Additional power of Commissioner:*

"(1)Notwithstanding that in any particular case a petition referred to in section 16(1)(a)(i) or (b) has not been presented against an employer, the Commissioner may, subject to subsection (2) of that section, make an ex gratia payment under that section in that case if in his opinion—  (a)the employer employs less than 20 employees;(b)sufficient evidence exists to support the presentation of a petition in that case on the ground—(i)if the employer is a company, that he is unable to pay his debts; or(ii)if the employer is a person other than a company, that he is liable to have a bankruptcy petition presented against him; and (c)it is unreasonable or uneconomic to present a petition in that case."

Three conditions have to hold together: fewer than 20 employees; sufficient evidence to support the presentation of a petition; and that presenting one would be unreasonable or uneconomic. *Read the opening words subject to subsection (2) of that section: a payment under section 18 is still a payment under section 16, so every ceiling in section 16(2), the statutory declaration in section 16(2)(a) and the six-month deadline set out immediately below apply to it unchanged. Section 18 removes the petition requirement and nothing else.*

The ceiling and the deadline are both in section 16(2)(e). The lead-in to subsection (2) is "The Commissioner shall not make any payment under subsection (1)—", and paragraph (e) reads in full:

"(e)in respect of wages in lieu of notice—(i)of an amount exceeding—(A)the equivalent of 1 month’s wages of the applicant; or(B)$45,000, whichever is the lesser; or (ii)subject to subsection (2A), which became due more than 6 months prior to the date of application;"

Subparagraph (ii) is a hard deadline: the Fund will not pay wages in lieu of notice that became due more than 6 months before the date of application (the subsection (2A) exception reaches only contracts terminated before the 1989 amending Ordinance commenced, so it does nothing for a reader today). This is a deadline for applying to the Fund, not a deadline for claiming against the employer — a different clock, in section 6 below.

And both limbs of the ceiling can be moved. Cap. 380 s.16(3) provides that the Legislative Council may by resolution amend the period specified in subsection (2)(e)(i)(A) or the amount specified in subsection (2)(e)(i)(B) — so what is movable is not only the $45,000 but the one month as well. For most readers the binding limit is the month rather than the dollar figure; but each is a level set by a power, not a fixed quantity.

$22,500 is a figure readers remember correctly, and the article's job is to say which ceiling it belongs to. There are two:

  • The severance-payment monthly-wage ceiling in Cap. 57 s.31G, which still reads $22,500 on the 14 May 2026 consolidation of Cap. 57 — and which the Legislative Council may amend by resolution published in the Gazette under Cap. 57 s.67A: "The Legislative Council may, by resolution published in the Gazette, amend the references to $22,500 in— (a)sections 31G and 31V (including those sections as modified by Schedule 11);(b)this section; and(c)sections 7 and 8 of Schedule 2 to the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap. 380),by substituting a different amount specified in the resolution."
  • The same figure has also been published as the Fund's notice-pay ceiling. Table 6 of the Director of Audit's Report No. 77, Chapter 6 (November 2021), setting out the ceilings of the Fund's payment items as at 30 June 2021, gives the wages-in-lieu-of-notice line as February 1996, 22,500. Cap. 380 (version in force 1 May 2025) reads $45,000.
  • The Fund's notice-pay ceiling rose from $22,500 to $45,000 with effect from 17 June 2022. The Government's release of 16 June 2022 records that the Legislative Council passed the resolution that day, that the adjustment would take effect on gazettal the next day, and that it applies where the liability for payment arose on or after that date. The current Fund ceiling is therefore the lesser of one month's wages and $45,000; the monthly-wage input cap in Cap. 57's severance formula remains a different $22,500.

5. Where this gets decided: the Labour Department, the Labour Tribunal — and a door you have not been told about

Two doors — and no statutory order between them. And a third, which is an exit rather than an entrance. ⚠ There is no statutory sequence between the first two: what the law requires is the section 15(1) certificate, and limb (a) of that subsection contemplates a party refusing to take part in conciliation, with the certificate issuing anyway.

The names first, because the names are themselves a problem

The first door is the Labour Department (labour disputes go to its Labour Relations Division). The second is the Labour Tribunal — in Chinese 勞資審裁處, and the last character is 處, not 署. Note the spelling:

  • Online, people sometimes call it 勞資審裁署.

And what has happened to people usually has a rough word and no legal one: they say 炒 (sacked), rarely the statutory 即時解僱.

What is not optional is the certificate, not the conciliation

Cap. 25 section 15(1):

"(1)The tribunal shall not hear a claim until a certificate in the prescribed form signed by a tribunal officer or an authorized officer is filed or produced to the effect that—(a)one or more of the parties has refused to take part in conciliation;(b)conciliation has been attempted but no settlement has been reached;(c)conciliation is unlikely to result in a settlement being reached; or(d)conciliation may prejudice the interests of a party."

Look at limb (a). The provision itself contemplates a party refusing to take part in conciliation, and the certificate issues anyway. So a party may decline to conciliate; nobody can skip the certificate.

The certificate has a deadline of its own, in the next subsection. Section 15(2):

"(2)A certificate under subsection (1) shall be filed with or produced to the tribunal not later than 24 hours before the date fixed for the hearing of the claim."

An arithmetic that looks wrong, and a provision that should not be used to explain it. In 2024 the Labour Department handled 13,029 labour disputes and claims and settled 77.4% through conciliation, leaving roughly 2,945 unsettled — while in the same calendar year the Labour Tribunal received 4,879 claims. The two counts use different units — the Department counts a dispute involving more than 20 employees as one matter, the Tribunal counts claims — so they can be neither subtracted nor divided. That is the explanation of the gap, and it is sufficient. (Note also that the 12,940 used in the paragraphs below is a different population: that series counts claims only, each involving 20 or fewer employees, while 13,029 counts disputes and claims together. The two are not interchangeable.)

What is signed at conciliation has the force of an award

Section 15(9):

"(9)A settlement filed under subsection (8) shall be treated for all purposes as if it were an award of the tribunal."

That is why whether to sign is a decision to take seriously. The Ordinance treats a filed settlement as an award; take advice before accepting any particular offer.

What you exchange by going to the Tribunal

Three unrelated instruments, one result — but the first has to be read with the subsection above it.

Cap. 25 section 23 is headed Right of audience. Section 23(1) lists who has one:

"(1)The following persons shall have a right of audience before the tribunal—(a)a claimant or defendant;(b)a tribunal officer;(c)an authorized officer;(d)an officer or servant of an unincorporated or incorporated company or a member of a partnership, if the company or partnership is a party; (e)with the leave of the tribunal, an office bearer of a registered trade union or of an association of employers who is authorized in writing by a claimant or defendant to appear as his representative; and (f)a public officer, not being a barrister or solicitor, who appears on behalf of the Secretary for Justice, if the Secretary for Justice is a claimant or a defendant."

Section 23(2) is the subsection that restricts barristers and solicitors:

"(2)A barrister or solicitor shall have a right of audience before the tribunal only if he is—(a)acting on his own behalf as a claimant or a defendant; or(b)appearing before the tribunal on behalf of an offender for the purpose of section 42."

Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), Schedule 2, Part 2, item 10:

"10.In the Labour Tribunal, proceedings under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)."

Read together, the accurate proposition is: no barrister or solicitor appears for either side before the tribunal — but that is not the same as no representation. Limb (e) allows an office bearer of a registered trade union or of an employers' association to appear as a party's representative, on the party's written authorisation and with the tribunal's leave; limb (d) allows a company or partnership that is a party to send an officer, servant or partner — so a corporate former employer can put someone in the room. Both limbs carry conditions: (e) needs a union, a written authorisation and leave. Not every reader has a union to call on. But the route is in the Ordinance, so the absence of a lawyer is not the absence of a representative.

And the Government's Procedural Advice Scheme for unrepresented litigants states its own scope as covering civil procedural matters in the named courts but not including civil proceedings in other tribunals — so it would not take a Labour Tribunal case even if you found it.

This site's reading (Cap. 25 s.23(2), Cap. 91 Sch. 2 Pt 2 item 10 and the Procedural Advice Scheme's own scope read together): for proceedings in the Labour Tribunal, a claimant has no legal aid, no barrister or solicitor appearing for them at the hearing, and no Procedural Advice Scheme; the one substitute the Ordinance leaves open is section 23(1)(e), which requires a union, a written authorisation and the tribunal's leave.

⚠ That sentence has to be read with its own scope. Item 10 says "In the Labour Tribunal, proceedings under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)" — *what it excepts is proceedings in that tribunal, not employment claims as such.* And Part 1 of the same Schedule 2 reads:

"Part 1Description of Proceedings1.Civil proceedings in any of the following courts—(a)Court of Final Appeal; (b)Court of Appeal; (c)Court of First Instance; (d)District Court."

Put the two together and this is the other face of the third door in section 5 of this article:

  • A claim transferred out of the Tribunal to the Court of First Instance or the District Court under Cap. 25 s.10(2) is no longer "proceedings in the Labour Tribunal", so the item 10 exception stops applying to it from that point, and the proceedings themselves are civil proceedings in a court named in Schedule 2 Part 1 item 1.
  • The same goes for an appeal. Cap. 25 section 32(1):

"(1)If any party is dissatisfied with an award, order or determination by the tribunal on the grounds that the award, order or determination is—(a)erroneous in point of law; or(b)outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal, such party may, within 7 days after the date on which the award, order or determination was served on him, or within such extended time as may be allowed by the Registrar of the High Court on good cause, apply to the Court of First Instance for leave to appeal and the Court of First Instance may grant such leave."

— that is an application to the Court of First Instance, and note its own 7-day limit, extendable by the Registrar of the High Court on good cause.

  • And for the appeal there is a provision written for exactly this: Cap. 91 Schedule 3 (the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme), Part 1, item 8:

"8.Civil proceedings in the Court of First Instance or Court of Appeal that are brought in respect of an appeal under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25) relating to a claim to which the person seeking legal aid is a party in the capacity as an employee (including proceedings incidental to the civil proceedings), and proceedings in a higher court that are related to the appeal."

The scope, stated to its limit: all of the above is about which category the Ordinance puts a class of proceedings in. Whether any person actually receives legal aid turns on Cap. 91 section 10 as well — the Director's satisfaction as to financial resources, and the grounds in section 10(3), one of which (paragraph (c)) is that it is unreasonable that the applicant should be granted legal aid in the particular circumstances of the case; and under section 18 an aided person may have to pay a contribution, computed under section 32 for the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme. This article states only where the Ordinance files each class of proceedings. It does not and cannot say whether any reader qualifies, or whether anyone should apply. The separate Free Legal Advice Scheme, on GovHK's own account, generally arranges a meeting with a volunteer lawyer around 3–4 weeks after booking (within two weeks for urgent cases) and gives preliminary advice only, with no follow-up and no representation.

There is a live error on a government page that a reader should know about: GovHK's legal-advice page still tells applicants they must satisfy the Procedural Advice Scheme's income eligibility limit, although that limit was abolished on 4 September 2023 — the English notice uses the word uplifted, and the Chinese version settles the ambiguity by using 撤銷, abolished. This is a fact about that page, not a comparison between service providers.

No ceiling; but there is a floor, and it is not written as a dollar figure in any section of Cap. 25

No section of Cap. 25 states any threshold as a sum of money. ⚠ But that does not answer what the reader is actually asking. Two limits have to be stated at once: first, the Tribunal's jurisdiction is not written in the sections at all; second, the floor is not written as a sum of money — it is written as a cross-reference.

Where the jurisdiction is: Cap. 25 section 7(1) gives the tribunal jurisdiction over "the claims specified in the Schedule". The line is at the end of paragraph 1 of that Schedule:

"other than a claim specified in the Schedule to the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453)."

The Chinese authentic text reads 「但《小額薪酬索償仲裁處條例》(第453章)附表內指明的申索除外。」

Paragraph 4 of the same Schedule, on severance payment, carries the identical words. So: a claim specified in the Schedule to Cap. 453 is outside the Labour Tribunal's jurisdiction — and what that Schedule specifies is stated above: not more than 10 claimants, not more than $15,000 per claimant, for a right of action arising on or after 17 September 2021:

"(c)the right of action of which arose on or after 17 September 2021, or not wholly before that date, and made by not more than 10 claimants for a sum of money not exceeding $15,000 per claimant, which arises from—(i)the breach of a term, whether express or implied or (if applicable) arising by force of section 10(1) of the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608), of a contract of employment, whether for performance in Hong Kong or under a contract to which the Contracts for Employment Outside Hong Kong Ordinance (Cap. 78) applies;(ii)the breach of a term, whether express or implied or (if applicable) arising by force of section 10(1) of the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608), of a contract of apprenticeship;(iii)the failure of a person to comply with the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), the Minimum Wage Ordinance (Cap. 608) or the Apprenticeship Ordinance (Cap. 47);(iv)any question as to the right of an employee to a severance payment under Part VA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) or the amount of such payment; or(v)any question as to the right of an employee to payment of wages by a person other than the employee’s employer under Part IXA of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57) or the amount of such payment."

Add Cap. 453 section 5(2): save as provided in that Ordinance, no claim within the Board's jurisdiction is actionable in any court. So the accurate proposition is: Cap. 25 prints no dollar figure anywhere, and it nonetheless carves the sub-$15,000 band out by cross-reference. "No ceiling and no floor" is therefore wrong.

The Judiciary's own account is the same. The Report of the Working Party on the Review of the Labour Tribunal (LC Paper CB(2)136/04-05, 118 pages) says at paragraph 2.13 that the Tribunal's jurisdiction is prescribed by section 7 and the Schedule and that, other than claims falling within the jurisdiction of the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board, the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over the categories it lists; paragraph 2.14 of the same report sets out the power described under the third door below. (Paraphrased from that report, not quoted.)

And the power that moves it, stated with it: Cap. 453 section 6 — "The Commissioner may by notice in the Gazette amend the Schedule." $15,000 is therefore not a fixed quantity but a level that a Gazette notice can change without any Bill.

$15,000 is the Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board's own per-claimant ceiling, for a right of action arising on or after 17 September 2021 (previously $8,000), for not more than 10 claimants — and the Commissioner for Labour may amend that Schedule by notice in the Gazette (above). The Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board also has a limitation period of its own, built like the two in section 6 below. Cap. 453 section 7(1):

"(1)Subject to subsection (2), the Board shall not have jurisdiction to inquire into, hear or determine a claim or part of a claim if the right of action arose more than 12 months before the date on which the claim is filed, unless the parties to the claim, by a memorandum signed by them and filed with the registrar, have agreed that the Board shall have jurisdiction."

Twelve months, and the only way past it is a memorandum signed by the parties and filed with the registrar. That limit is that Board's, not the Labour Tribunal's.

What is above is how the Ordinance draws the line. How the three forums interlock, how the procedure runs, and which forum any individual claim will actually end up in is a different article's question — see the Labour Tribunal: which claims it takes .

The third door: the Tribunal can send the case away, for any reason

Cap. 25 section 7(2) is often quoted for exclusive jurisdiction:

"(2)Save as is provided in this Ordinance, no claim within the jurisdiction of the tribunal shall be actionable in any court in Hong Kong."

But read the opening words: "Save as is provided in this Ordinance". The Ordinance does provide. Section 10(1):

"(1)The tribunal may, at any stage of proceedings, if it is of the opinion that for any reason the claim should not be heard and determined by it, decline jurisdiction."

Section 10(2):

"(2)The tribunal may, when it declines jurisdiction under subsection (1), transfer the claim to the Court of First Instance, the District Court or the Small Claims Tribunal, in such manner as may be prescribed."

On those two subsections: the words impose no test, no threshold and no monetary trigger — "for any reason", on the Tribunal's own opinion. ⚠ That is a statement about the subsections, not about the practice. A discretion expressed in open words is still exercised on recognised considerations.

But section 10 has six subsections, not two, and the other four carve out a whole class of claim. Sections 10(3) to (6) each provide:

"(3)This section shall not apply to any claim transferred to the tribunal in accordance with any rules made under section 73B of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)."

Sections 10(4), (5) and (6) are identical in form, pointing to sections 73C, 73D and 73E of the District Court Ordinance. So: where a claim was transferred into the Tribunal under rules made under Cap. 336 ss.73B–73E, section 10 does not apply to it at all, and the Tribunal cannot use section 10 to send it on. The power described above is a power over a claim brought in the Tribunal in the first place.

And the same reading has to be applied to section 7 itself. Section 7(2), quoted above, is one of six subsections; the four that follow it are that subsection's own express carve-outs:

"(3)Subsection (2) shall not operate to prevent the transfer of any claim to the tribunal in accordance with any rules made under section 73B of the District Court Ordinance (Cap. 336)."

Sections 7(4), (5) and (6) repeat the form for sections 73C, 73D and 73E. So "Save as is provided in this Ordinance" is not a formula: the Ordinance provides four times inside section 7 itself, before it provides again in section 10.

And this is not hypothetical. Footnote 1 of the judgment discussed in section 3 records:

"The present action began as LBTC 3314/2018 instituted before the Labour Tribunal, which by order dated 6 June 2019 was transferred to the High Court."

This site's reading (sections 7(2), 10(1) and 10(2) read together): the exclusivity in section 7(2) is a prohibition on suing elsewhere, not a guarantee of staying here. And the two things a claimant most often chooses the Tribunal for — that neither side may bring a lawyer, and that costs do not follow the event — are neither of them guaranteed.

And the second one has a further layer: even if the case stays in the Tribunal from beginning to end, costs exposure is not zero. Cap. 25 section 28 is headed Costs:

"(1)Subject to subsection (2), the tribunal may award to a party costs and expenses, which may include—(a)any reasonable expenses necessarily incurred and any loss of salary or wages suffered by that party; and(b)any reasonable sum paid to a witness for the expenses necessarily incurred and any loss of salary or wages suffered by him,in attending a hearing of the tribunal or in being interviewed by a tribunal officer."

Three levels, kept apart: (i) in the Tribunal itself, section 28 lets the tribunal award a party costs and expenses, including reasonable expenses necessarily incurred and salary or wages lost in attending a hearing or being interviewed by a tribunal officer, and by section 28(3) an award of costs is enforceable like any other award. That is not High Court costs-follow-the-event, and it is not nothing either. (ii) Once a claim is transferred out under section 10(2), or (iii) on a section 32 appeal, the court's own costs rules apply. The Report of the Working Party on the Review of the Labour Tribunal records at paragraphs 5.122 to 5.127 that the proposals to cap costs on appeal, and not to award costs against an unsuccessful party on a Tribunal appeal, were not adopted, the Working Party seeing no compelling justification for them; the same passages record the contrary arguments deputations put. (Paraphrased, not quoted.)

The Tribunal's fees are in subsidiary legislation — the fee scale is a statutory Schedule, not a departmental price list. Rule 2 of the Labour Tribunal (Fees) Rules (Cap. 25, sub. leg. B; version in force 1 February 2018):

"The fees specified in the Schedule shall be payable in respect of all proceedings taken in the tribunal."

*Item 1 of that Schedule, Filing of claim, has four bands, set by the amount of the claim:*

the Schedule's own words, item 1fee
"where the claim does not exceed $2,000"$20
"where the claim exceeds $2,000 but does not exceed $5,000"$30
"where the claim exceeds $5,000 but does not exceed $10,000"$40
"where the claim exceeds $10,000"$50

The same Schedule also prescribes $45 for an "Application for review" (item 3), $45 for an "Application for leave to appeal" (item 4), and $25 for a "Subpoena and copy including service, each witness" (item 2).

⚠ These are not fixed figures, and the power that moves them is in the legislation itself. The Schedule is the Schedule to rules made under section 45 of the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25), so amending the Schedule changes the fee; and in an individual case rule 4 of Cap. 25 sub. leg. B gives the registrar a separate power:

"The registrar may reduce, remit or defer payment of any fee specified in the Schedule as he may think fit in any particular case and shall, if he exercises this power, endorse on the relevant document a note of the reduction, remission or deferment and of the reasons therefor."

Two further figures are not in that Schedule, so they are kept separate. The Judiciary's Labour Tribunal page adds two: $10 falls due for every address at which the defendant has to be reached with the papers, and the two forms it names — an "Application to Set Aside an Award/Order" and an "Application for Restoration of a Claim" — carry a prescribed $45 each. (This site's summary of that page; the page's own fee table is headed "as at December 2017".) The only $10 in the Cap. 25 sub. leg. B Schedule is item 5(b), "Each additional copy". The $10 per address is therefore the Judiciary page's figure, not a Schedule fee.

What the published waiting times measure, and what they do not

Over 2019–2024, from filing to first hearing: 25, 23, 22, 24, 23 and 23 days against the Tribunal's own 30-day target, met in all six years. Over the same years, from appointment to filing: 29, 61, 25, 28, 38 and 36 days against the same 30-day target, missed in three.

Neither figure measures time to a decision. And the Judiciary's own definition of a disposal includes claims transferred — so on that definition a case that leaves the Tribunal is counted as concluded.

One case, for illustration: in the case above, dismissal (a Termination Letter dated 7 September 2018) to judgment (18 June 2025) is 2,476 days — 6.8 years; the transfer order of 6 June 2019 to judgment is 2,204 days. That is one transferred High Court case, not a Tribunal case, and it is not comparable as a rate with the averages above. What the two are comparable on is what is being measured: the Judiciary publishes the wait at the front of the process and stops counting at disposal; the case above was still running six years after it was disposed of.

How many people go this way — and one number that is not a success rate

⚠ Every Labour Department figure below comes from the Department's 2016–2024 statistics.

  • In 2024 the Labour Department handled 13,029 labour disputes and claims and settled 77.4% through conciliation. Over 2016–2024 the settlement rate ran 72.9, 71.7, 74.1, 75.9, 74.7, 74.6, 75.9, 77.2 and 77.4 per cent.
  • Of the 12,940 claims the Labour Relations Division handled in 2024, termination of contract accounted for 4,585 — 35.4%, down from 6,670 of 14,672 (45.5%) in 2016. 2024 is the first year in that nine-year series in which wage disputes (5,338, 41.3%) overtook it.
  • From 2018 to 2022 the Labour Department handled 40 Part VI A claim cases in which employees asked for reinstatement or re-engagement. For scale: the same body, the same counting unit (claims, each involving 20 or fewer employees) and the same five years — 13,691 (2018) + 13,755 (2019) + 10,991 (2020) + 11,064 (2021) + 10,615 (2022) = 60,116 claims. 40 of 60,116 is 0.067%, about 1 claim in 1,500 in which anyone asked for their job back. The unit is claims, not people: one claim is not one person, so the ratio is not a head count. Of the 40, 17 settled at the Department and 23 were filed with the Tribunal; of those 23, 22 never reached a ruling at all (6 withdrawn, 9 settled by monetary remedy with both parties' consent, 7 adjourned sine die), and 1 was ruled against the employee. That is the Part VI A population, not the position facing a summary-dismissal claimant.

None of these is a success rate. The Judiciary's own definition of a disposal covers claims awarded, dismissed, settled, withdrawn and transferred alike — which is precisely why its figures cannot be read as outcomes.

The Department conciliates; the Tribunal adjudicates; and the Tribunal can, for any reason, hand the case to another court.

6. Time limits: more than one clock — and the most general answer is in the Limitation Ordinance, not the Labour Tribunal Ordinance

The most general answer is in the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), and it is six years. Section 4(1), as consolidated 9 July 2020 — the lead-in with paragraph (a):

"(1)The following actions shall not be brought after the expiration of 6 years from the date on which the cause of action accrued, that is to say—(a)actions founded on simple contract or on tort;"

And paragraph (d) of the same subsection, with (b) and (c) intervening:

"(d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance or imperial enactment, other than a penalty or forfeiture or sum by way of penalty or forfeiture:"

A claim for wages in lieu of notice is a claim on the contract of employment and so an action founded on simple contract under paragraph (a); a sum claimed directly by virtue of a provision of the Ordinance falls under paragraph (d). Either way it is six years, running from the date the cause of action accrued. The scope has to be stated: section 4 sets other periods for other actions in the same section (twelve years on a specialty, two years for a penalty), and other provisions of the Limitation Ordinance deal with disability, fraud and acknowledgment. The point to remember: Cap. 347 s.4(1) is the general answer, and it is not in the Labour Tribunal Ordinance.

As for the Labour Tribunal Ordinance itself: it sets no limitation period of its own for an ordinary claim. No section of Cap. 25 fixes any period within which a claim must be brought.

A Part VI A claim runs two clocks, and each is stated here with the power that can move it:

  • 3 months — a claim made by notice in writing to the employer before the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the relevant date, or within such extended period not exceeding 6 months as the Commissioner may permit.
  • 9 months — or a claim filed with the Registrar of the Labour Tribunal before the end of the period of 9 months beginning with the relevant date. Beyond the 9 months the Tribunal has no jurisdiction unless the parties, by a memorandum signed by them and filed with the Registrar, have agreed that it shall.

Neither is a fact about the calendar. Each is a fact about the statute's structure — one extendable by the Commissioner, the other waivable by the parties' filed agreement. Both limits apply to a Part VI A claim (see unreasonable vs unlawful dismissal ), not to an ordinary claim for wages in lieu of notice.

7. How other places do it — and why English formulations do not simply transfer

Two comparable systems put the allocation in the instrument a claimant is pointed to. Hong Kong's is in the common law that section 9(1)(b) imports — which is exactly why it is stated by the Judiciary, the Law Reform Commission and practitioners rather than by the Ordinance.

England puts it on the face of the statute. Employment Rights Act 1996, section 98(1) (UK legislation from legislation.gov.uk, used under the Open Government Licence v3.0):

"In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show—"
"(a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and"
"(b) that it is either a reason falling within subsection (2) or some other substantial reason of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the employee held."

But the next subsection sets the scope of the comparison, and it favours neither side:

"(4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer)—"
"(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and"
"(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case."

So what England allocates on the face of the statute is the burden of showing the reason — not a burden of showing the dismissal was justified, which under s.98(4) is a determination that carries no burden on either party.

The qualifying period under that Act is two years (s.108(1)), and the tribunal time limit is three months, extendable on a not-reasonably-practicable test (s.111(2)). The two years is a dated fact: the text relied on here is the legislation.gov.uk revised text, as at 28 August 2026. And it already has an amendment that is not in force: the Employment Rights Act 2025 (c. 36), s.25(2)(a) reads "in subsection (1), for "two years" substitute "six months";", and s.25 was not in force at Royal Assent (s.159(3)). So two years is the position at that version date, not a settled one.

⚠ That amendment now has an announced commencement date. The UK Government's business guidance site (business.gov.uk) states that from 1 January 2027 the qualifying period for protection against ordinary unfair dismissal falls from two years to six months, that the qualifying period attaching to an employee’s right to ask for the reason for a dismissal in writing drops to six months on the same date, and that the cap on the compensatory award a tribunal may award is removed from that date; where a termination takes effect earlier than that date, the period that governs is still the present two years. (This site's summary of that page.) That is an announced date, not a completed commencement: section 159(3) of the Employment Rights Act 2025 (from legislation.gov.uk, used under the Open Government Licence v3.0) leaves commencement to a power —

"The other provisions of this Act come into force in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of State."

— so when section 25 comes into force is for the Secretary of State to set by regulations. Read against the legislation.gov.uk revised text: that page states it is up to date with all changes known to be in force on or before 29 August 2026, section 25's commencement note still reads "S. 25 not in force at Royal Assent, see s. 159(3)", and only section 25(5) is recorded in force from 1 July 2026 for specified purposes by S.I. 2026/559. So: two years remains the law at that version date; six months has an announced start date of 1 January 2027; and as at those dates the revised text records no regulations bringing section 25 as a whole into force.

Singapore publishes it in the Government Gazette. The Tripartite Guidelines on Wrongful Dismissal did not begin in 2024: the Ministry of Manpower and its two tripartite partners released a set of guidelines on what constitutes wrongful dismissal on 1 April 2019, alongside the transfer of wrongful-dismissal adjudication from the Ministry to the Employment Claims Tribunals. The current guidelines were first published in the Gazette on 23 July 2024, and state at paragraph 4 that where misconduct or poor performance is cited as the reason for dismissal the employer bears the burden of proving that ground, and that the dismissal is wrongful if the employer cannot.

This site's reading (Cap. 57 s.9 read against ERA 1996 ss.98(1) and 98(4)): both comparators put the allocation of who must produce the reason for the dismissal inside the statute a claimant is sent to read. Hong Kong's section 9 does not — which is why, here, the proposition has to be carried by a Judiciary pamphlet, a Law Reform Commission footnote and law firm articles instead. The comparison stops there: what England writes into the statute is the burden of showing the reason, not the whole question whether the dismissal was justified, which s.98(4) leaves with no burden on either side. So the English arrangement is not the same proposition as the Hong Kong one that an employer must prove a summary dismissal justified.

But do not import the English formulation on that account — and the limit is the Court of Final Appeal's own. In FACV 2/2005:

"Like the Court of Appeal, I do not regard the "band of reasonable responses" approach as the correct one for the purposes of the provisions in question."

"Our employment legislation is materially different from that of the United Kingdom."

The scope matters: the Court rejected an English gloss, not employee protection. Section 32A(2)'s assistance to the employee was left entirely intact, and the employer won that appeal on its facts — so Hong Kong's case law does not run in one direction, and employers do not usually lose.

Frequently Asked Questions

He said my attitude was bad and dismissed me on the spot — doesn't he need to have issued warning letters first?
A: Section 9(1)(a) lists four grounds (wilful disobedience of a lawful and reasonable order; misconduct inconsistent with the due and faithful discharge of duties; fraud or dishonesty; habitual neglect of duties), and section 9(1)(b) imports on top of them the common-law grounds for terminating without notice. **The section itself requires no warning letter and lays down no procedure for one.** The Labour Department's guide adds a note that summary dismissal is a serious disciplinary action applying only where an employee has committed very serious misconduct or fails to improve after repeated warnings — **but that sentence is the Department's, not the Ordinance's.** Whether any particular dismissal was justified turns on the whole of the facts.
My contract says he can dismiss me without notice and without payment. Is that the end of it?
A: Section 8(b) preserves the right of **a party** to a contract of employment to terminate without notice or payment in lieu under sections 9, 10 or 11(2) — the same English words appear at section 10(c) for the employee. **A contractual clause does not convert section 9 into an automatic pass**: paragraph (b) points to the grounds on which a party **would be entitled** to terminate without notice **at common law**, not to whatever the contract says. **And the Ordinance has a provision that answers this question in terms — Cap. 57 section 70, headed *Contracting out*:** The Chinese authentic text reads 「僱傭合約的任何條款,如看來使本條例賦予僱員的任何權利、利益或保障終絕或減少,即屬無效。」 **The notice period in section 6 and the payment in lieu in section 7 are rights conferred upon the employee by the Ordinance, so a term that purports to extinguish or reduce them is void under section 70.** **A clause saying the employer may dismiss without notice and without payment therefore cannot, by itself, turn section 9 into an automatic pass.**
So who actually has to produce the evidence?
A: The Ordinance gives no general answer. It allocates expressly in three places only: section 15(1B) (pregnant employees), section 33(4BAA) (paid sickness days) and section 32A(2) (Part VI A). **For an ordinary summary dismissal**: the Judiciary's trial-preparation guidance tells Labour Tribunal litigants the defendant bears it; the Law Reform Commission wrote the same in a 2010 footnote; three law firms state it and none of the three mentions the 2025 judgment; and in 2025 a Court of First Instance judgment put it on the employer and found it undischarged. **The LRC added in its next paragraph that there is no simple answer to whether a summary dismissal is justified unless the full facts and circumstances are examined.**
Do I need a lawyer, and could I afford one?
A: Cap. 25 section 23(2) gives a barrister or solicitor a right of audience before the Tribunal only if acting on their own behalf as a party, or appearing for an offender under section 42. **But section 23(1) of the same section lists who does have a right of audience, and limb (e) allows an office bearer of a registered trade union or an employers' association to appear as a party's representative with the party's written authorisation and the tribunal's leave, while limb (d) allows a company or partnership that is a party to send an officer, servant or partner. So the accurate proposition is: no barrister or solicitor appears for either side — not that there is no representation at all.** Schedule 2, Part 2, item 10 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91) places "**In the Labour Tribunal**, proceedings under the Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25)" outside legal aid — **what it excepts is proceedings in that tribunal**: a claim transferred to the Court of First Instance or District Court under Cap. 25 s.10(2), and an appeal to the Court of First Instance under Cap. 25 s.32, are not within that item, and the appeal route is expressly covered by Schedule 3 Part 1 item 8 (the Supplementary Legal Aid Scheme). **Whether aid is actually granted still turns on the financial-resources test in Cap. 91 s.10 and the grounds in s.10(3), and a contribution may be payable under s.18.** The Government's Procedural Advice Scheme excludes civil proceedings in other tribunals. **The Free Legal Advice Scheme**, on GovHK's own account, generally arranges a volunteer-lawyer meeting around 3–4 weeks after booking and gives preliminary advice only, with no follow-up and no representation.
The Labour Department could not resolve it. Where next?
A: The Labour Tribunal. Cap. 25 section 15(1) means the Tribunal cannot hear a claim until a conciliation certificate is filed or produced — **and one form of that certificate is that a party has refused to take part in conciliation.** Note sections 10(1) and 10(2): the Tribunal may, at any stage, if it is of the opinion that for any reason the claim should not be heard by it, decline jurisdiction and transfer the claim to the Court of First Instance, the District Court or the Small Claims Tribunal. **The judgment in section 3 above reached the High Court that way.**
Is there a deadline?
A: **The most general limit is not in the Labour Tribunal Ordinance but in the Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), section 4(1): actions founded on simple contract, and actions to recover a sum recoverable by virtue of any Ordinance, must be brought within six years of the date the cause of action accrued.** A claim for wages in lieu of notice is the first of those. The Labour Tribunal Ordinance itself sets no limitation period for an ordinary claim. **A Part VI A claim runs two**: a written claim to the employer within 3 months of the relevant date, **extendable to not more than 6 months as the Commissioner may permit**; or a claim filed with the Registrar within 9 months, **beyond which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction unless the parties file a signed memorandum agreeing that it shall**. Both apply to Part VI A claims only.

Next Steps

Sources

  • Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57), version in force 14 May 2026: ss.3(2), 6(1), 6(2), 6(2A), 6(2B), 6(3), 6(3A), 7(1A), 7(1B), 7(1D), 7(4), 8, 8A(1), 8A(3), 9, 15(1B), 15(1C), 25(1), 25(2), 25A(1), 31G, 32A(1), 32A(2), 32K, 33(4BAA), 33(4BAB), 63C, 67A, 70
  • Labour Tribunal Ordinance (Cap. 25), version in force 28 March 2025: s.7(1), ss.7(2), 7(3)–(6), 10(1)–(6), 15(1), 15(2), 15(9), 23(1), 23(2), 28(1), 28(3), 32(1), and paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Schedule
  • Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91), version in force 27 March 2026: Schedule 2 Part 1 item 1, Schedule 2 Part 2 item 10, Schedule 3 Part 1 item 8, and ss.10, 18, 32
  • Limitation Ordinance (Cap. 347), version in force 9 July 2020: s.4(1)
  • Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance (Cap. 453), version in force 17 September 2021: ss.5(1), 5(2), 6, 7 and the Schedule (tier (c))
  • Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance (Cap. 380), version in force 1 May 2025: ss.16(1), 16(1)(a)(ii), 16(1A), 16(2)(e), 16(2)(g)(i), 16(2A), 16(3), 18(1)
  • Employment Rights Act 1996 (UK), ss.98(1), 98(4), 108(1), 111(2), revised text from legislation.gov.uk (as at 28 August 2026), used under the Open Government Licence v3.0
  • Employment Rights Act 2025 (UK, c. 36), ss.25(2), 159(3) (the not-yet-in-force amendment to ERA 1996 s.108(1)), from legislation.gov.uk (as at 28 August 2026), used under the Open Government Licence v3.0
  • UK Government business guidance, "Unfair dismissal rights": https://www.business.gov.uk/campaign/employment-changes/employers/unfair-dismissal-rights/ (the 1 January 2027 announcement; summarised here, not reproduced)
  • Judiciary, Labour Tribunal page: https://www.judiciary.hk/en/court_services_facilities/labour.html (the $10-per-address service fee and the $45 set-aside/restoration fees; summarised here, not reproduced)
  • Labour Tribunal (Fees) Rules (Cap. 25, sub. leg. B), rules 2 and 4 and the whole Schedule (13 items), version in force 1 February 2018
  • [2025] HKCFI 2484, HCA 1135/2019 (Court of First Instance, 18 June 2025)
  • FACV 2/2005 (Court of Final Appeal, 4 November 2005), on appeal from CACV 253/2002
  • Judiciary, General Guidelines for Preparation for Trial — Labour Tribunal, https://www.judiciary.hk/doc/en/court_services_facilities/guidelines_for_trial_06ed1_e.pdf
  • Judiciary, Hong Kong Judiciary Annual Report 2024, Labour Tribunal caseload and waiting times, https://www.judiciary.hk/en/publications/annu_rept_2024r/eng/caseload_lb.html , page stamped last updated 26 February 2025
  • Labour Department, A Concise Guide to the Employment Ordinance (finalised December 2025), https://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/wcp/ConciseGuide/EO_guide_full.pdf
  • Labour Department, labour disputes and claims statistics 2016–2024, https://www.labour.gov.hk/eng/public/iprd/2024/figure_en/figure3_1.htm and figure3_5.htm
  • Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Sexual Offences Records Checks for Child-Related Work: Interim Proposals, February 2010, https://www.hkreform.gov.hk/en/docs/rsexoff_e.pdf
  • Director of Audit, Report No. 77, Chapter 6, Table 6, ceilings of the Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund's payment items as at 30 June 2021, November 2021, https://www.aud.gov.hk/pdf_e/e77ch06.pdf
  • HKSAR Government press release, "Maximum amounts of ex gratia payment items from Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund to be raised", 16 June 2022 (adjustment effective 17 June 2022), https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202206/16/P2022061600224p.htm
  • Legislative Council, Official Record of Proceedings, 13 December 2023 (reinstatement and re-engagement claim figures), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr2023/english/counmtg/hansard/cm20231213-translate-e.pdf
  • GovHK, Legal Advice page, https://www.gov.hk/en/residents/government/legal/advice/advice.htm , page stamped last revised March 2026
  • Administration Wing, Chief Secretary for Administration's Office, Procedural Advice Scheme scope, https://www.admwing.gov.hk/js/content/paso.js
  • Singapore, Tripartite Guidelines on Wrongful Dismissal, gazetted 23 July 2024; and Singapore Ministry of Manpower press release of 1 April 2019 (tripartite partners release guidelines on what constitutes wrongful dismissal)
  • Judiciary, Report of the Working Party on the Review of the Labour Tribunal, LC Paper CB(2)136/04-05, 118 pages, paragraphs 2.13, 2.14 and 5.122–5.127 (paraphrased, not quoted)

雙語條文對照/Bilingual provision index

本附錄同時適用於上述兩個語言部分,列出正文所依據的條文及其兩種語文的名稱。

This appendix serves both language sections above. It lists the provisions the article relies on, with their names in both languages.

<table> <caption>條文對照/Provision index. 版本:第57章為2026年5月14日生效版本;第25章為2025年3月28日生效版本;第91章為2026年3月27日生效版本;第347章為2020年7月9日生效版本;第453章為2021年9月17日生效版本;第380章為2025年5月1日生效版本;第25章附屬法例B為2018年2月1日生效版本。/Versions in force: Cap. 57 at 14 May 2026; Cap. 25 at 28 March 2025; Cap. 91 at 27 March 2026; Cap. 347 at 9 July 2020; Cap. 453 at 17 September 2021; Cap. 380 at 1 May 2025; Cap. 25 sub. leg. B at 1 February 2018.</caption> <thead> <tr><th>條文/Provision</th><th>中文/Chinese</th><th>English</th></tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>第57章/Cap. 57</td><td>《僱傭條例》</td><td>Employment Ordinance</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章/Cap. 25</td><td>《勞資審裁處條例》</td><td>Labour Tribunal Ordinance</td></tr> <tr><td>第91章/Cap. 91</td><td>《法律援助條例》</td><td>Legal Aid Ordinance</td></tr> <tr><td>第453章/Cap. 453</td><td>《小額薪酬索償仲裁處條例》</td><td>Minor Employment Claims Adjudication Board Ordinance</td></tr> <tr><td>第380章/Cap. 380</td><td>《破產欠薪保障條例》</td><td>Protection of Wages on Insolvency Ordinance</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章附屬法例B/Cap. 25 sub. leg. B</td><td>《勞資審裁處(費用)規則》</td><td>Labour Tribunal (Fees) Rules</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章附屬法例B第4條/Cap. 25 sub. leg. B r.4</td><td>司法常務主任的權力</td><td>Power of registrar</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章附屬法例B附表第1項/Cap. 25 sub. leg. B, Schedule item 1</td><td>提交申索書</td><td>Filing of claim</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第9條標題/Cap. 57 s.9 heading</td><td>僱主不給予通知而終止合約的情況</td><td>Termination of contract without notice by employer</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第9(1)(b)條/Cap. 57 s.9(1)(b)</td><td>普通法</td><td>common law</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第3(2)條/Cap. 57 s.3(2)</td><td>舉證責任</td><td>onus of proving</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第3條/Cap. 57 s.3</td><td>連續性合約</td><td>continuous contract</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第7(1A)條/Cap. 57 s.7(1A)</td><td>代通知金</td><td>payment in lieu of notice</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第7(1A)條/Cap. 57 s.7(1A)</td><td>通知日期</td><td>date of notification</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第VIA部/Cap. 57 Part VI A</td><td>僱傭保障</td><td>Employment Protection</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第32K條/Cap. 57 s.32K</td><td>正當理由</td><td>valid reason</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第32I、32J條/Cap. 57 ss.32I, 32J</td><td>有關日期</td><td>relevant date</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章第15條/Cap. 25 s.15</td><td>調停證明書</td><td>conciliation certificate</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章第15(9)條/Cap. 25 s.15(9)</td><td>裁斷</td><td>award</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章第23條/Cap. 25 s.23</td><td>出庭發言權</td><td>right of audience</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章第10條/Cap. 25 s.10</td><td>拒絕行使司法管轄權/移交</td><td>decline jurisdiction / transfer</td></tr> <tr><td>第347章/Cap. 347</td><td>《時效條例》</td><td>Limitation Ordinance</td></tr> <tr><td>第347章第4(1)條/Cap. 347 s.4(1)</td><td>訴訟因由產生的日期</td><td>the date on which the cause of action accrued</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第70條標題/Cap. 57 s.70 heading</td><td>訂立本條例不適用的合約條款</td><td>Contracting out</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第8條標題/Cap. 57 s.8 heading</td><td>權利的保留</td><td>Saving of rights</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第6(3)、(3A)條/Cap. 57 ss.6(3), (3A)</td><td>試用性質</td><td>on probation</td></tr> <tr><td>第57章第7(4)條/Cap. 57 s.7(4)</td><td>超時工作薪酬</td><td>overtime pay</td></tr> <tr><td>第380章第16(1)條/Cap. 380 s.16(1)</td><td>特惠款項</td><td>ex gratia payment</td></tr> <tr><td>第453章第7條標題/Cap. 453 s.7 heading</td><td>時效</td><td>Limitation</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章第2條/Cap. 25 s.2</td><td>司法常務主任</td><td>registrar</td></tr> <tr><td>第25章第2條/Cap. 25 s.2</td><td>調查主任</td><td>tribunal officer</td></tr> <tr><td>—</td><td>勞工處勞資關係科</td><td>Labour Relations Division, Labour Department</td></tr> <tr><td>—</td><td>破產欠薪保障基金</td><td>Protection of Wages on Insolvency Fund</td></tr> <tr><td>—</td><td>無律師代表民事程序法律諮詢計劃</td><td>Procedural Advice Scheme for Unrepresented Litigants</td></tr> <tr><td>—</td><td>免費法律諮詢計劃</td><td>Free Legal Advice Scheme</td></tr> </tbody> </table>

Last updated: 5 September 2026 / 最後更新:2026年9月5日

This article provides general legal information about Hong Kong law for educational purposes only. It is not legal advice and does not create a solicitor-client relationship. The law changes, and how the law applies depends on the specific facts of each case. For advice on your situation, please consult a qualified Hong Kong solicitor. HKGoodLawyer is a technology platform and lawyer referral directory; we do not provide legal services.

本文僅提供有關香港法律的一般法律資訊,供教育用途。內容並不構成法律意見,亦不會產生律師與客戶關係。法律會更改,實際應用取決於個別案件的具體事實。如需就閣下情況尋求意見,請諮詢合資格的香港律師。香港好律師 為科技平台及律師轉介名冊,並不提供法律服務。

本文仅提供有关香港法律的一般法律信息,供教育用途。内容并不构成法律意见,亦不会产生律师与客户关系。法律会更改,实际应用取决于个别案件的具体事实。如需就阁下情况寻求意见,请咨询合资格的香港律师。香港好律师 为科技平台及律师转介名册,并不提供法律服务。